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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding Ms.

Black alimony that was nonterminable, even upon her remarriage?
The standard of appellate review is an abuse of discretion.

See

Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 251-252 (Utah Ct. App 1993). Mr.
Barney preserved this issue in the trial court.
2.
child

R. 566.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding

support

to Ms. Black

in

the

amount

of

$2,220.00

by

extrapolation of the statutory child support table?

The standard

of appellate review is an abuse of discretion.

See Ball v.

Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Utah Ct. App 1996).
preserved this issue in the trial court.
3.

Mr. Barney

R. 996, pp. 40-42.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding

judgment in favor of Ms. Black in the amount of: (i) $8,000.00
representing one-half of the value of the duplex real property
awarded to Mr. Barney; and (ii) $2 0,000.00 representing one half of
the value of the dental practice awarded to Mr. Barney.
standard of appellate review is an abuse of discretion.
v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App 1993).
preserved this issue in the trial court.
996, pp. 55-60.

1

The

See Hall

Mr. Barney

R. 995, pp. 56-8 and R.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Relative to the nonterminable alimony issue, Utah Code

Ann. § 30-3-5(8)

(1999) is determinative, which provides, in

relevant part:
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage
or death of that former spouse. . . .
2.

Relative to the child support issue, Utah Code Ann. § 78-

45-7.12 (1999) is determinative, which provides:
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds
the highest level specified in the table, an
appropriate and just child support amount
shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, but
the amount ordered may not be less than the
highest level specified in the table for the
number of children due support.
3.

Relative to the judgment issue, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-

5(1) (1999) is determinative, which provides, in relevant part:
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or
obligations, and parties. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Course of Proceedings.
This is a divorce action. On March 26, 1997, Ms. Black filed

her Complaint for divorce.

R. 1-12.

On August 8, 1997, the trial court entered an Order on Order
to Show Cause setting temporary terms during the pendency of the
action relative to a hearing before Commissioner David S. Dillon
2

held on June 5, 1997. R. 148-53.

Each party filed objections to

the recommendations of the Commissioner. R.

114-22.

On November

3, 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing on the objections and
overruled the objections.

R. 268-71.

On November 25, 1997, the trial court entered a Judgment and
Decree of Divorce, whereby the parties were divorced and all other
issues were reserved.

R. 214-7.

On April 14, 1998, the trial court entered an Order on Order
to Show Cause relative to a hearing before Commissioner Scott M.
Hadley held on December 10, 1997.

R. 284-91.

In the Order on

Order to Show Cause, among other items, (i) judgment was entered
against Mr. Barney in the amount of $11,882.26 in favor of Ms.
Black for alimony arrearages less certain offsets, (ii) Mr. Barney
was found not to be in contempt for his failure to pay the
temporary alimony amounts for the reasons that he did not have the
ability to pay the amounts he was ordered to pay and that Mr.
Barney had not been financially irresponsible since the time of the
hearing setting temporary alimony; (iii) the trial court reserved
the issue of whether Ms. Black had interfered with Mr. Barney's
physical and telephone visitation until an evidentiary hearing
could be held; and (iv) Ms. Black was found in contempt for her
failure to seek or secure employment as ordered at the time of the
hearing setting temporary alimony on June 5, 1997.
On October 22, 1998, the trial court entered its Findings,
Recommendation and Order relative to Mr. Barney's Motion for
3

Citation

of

Contempt

and

Other

Relief

which

was

heard

Commissioner Scott M. Hadley on May 18, 1998. R. 50 3-14.

by

In the

Findings, Recommendation and Order, the trial court, among other
things, (i) found Ms. Black in contempt for her failure to seek
employment or to keep and provide a log of her attempts to secure
employment; (ii) found Ms. Black to not be in contempt as to
visitation interference but did find that she had violated the
order of the trial court relative to the visitation that had been
ordered;

(iii) found Ms. Black in contempt for involving the

children in the financial issues between the parties, and (iv)
awarded Mr. Barney his attorney fees as a sanction against Ms.
Black.
On October 23, 1998, Mr. Barney filed a Motion in Limine to
Exclude Certain Testimony.

R. 517-25.

The Motion was filed to

exclude any testimony which Ms. Black might attempt to illicit from
any expert or other witness at trial on the value of Mr. Barney's
dental practice which included goodwill as an element.

Over

objection, the trial court received evidence regarding the alleged
goodwill present in Mr. Barney's dental practice. R. 994, pp. 23497.
Trial was conducted on October 27 and 29, 1998.

R. 526-27.

After considering the closing arguments of counsel, the trial court
ruled on the issues before it. R. 526-7 and R. 995, pp. 1-67. As
a part of that ruling, the trial court held that alimony would
terminate on the statutory events.
4

R. 527 and R. 995, p. 54. At

the conclusion of the ruling, Ms. Black requested the trial court
to consider the potential of awarding nonterminable alimony.
995, p. 61.

R.

The trial court reversed its prior ruling, reserved

the issue of nonterminable alimony and requested the parties to
file post-trial briefs on the issue.

R. 995, pp. 61-3.

On

February 1, 1999, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision on
the issue of nonterminable alimony and granted the same to Ms.
Black.

R. 704-7.

Mr. Barney filed objections to the form of the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel for Ms. Black. R.
760-803. On March 15, 1999, the trial court heard argument on the
objections.

R. 810 and R. 996, pp. 1-76.

On June 8, 1999, the

trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.
832-66) and its Divorce Decree (R. 813a-831). The Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are included as
Exhibits A and B, respectively, of the Addendum.
On June 15, 1999, Mr. Barney filed his Notice of Appeal. R.
867-9.
Ms. Black remarried on May 15, 1999.
B.

R. 889.

Statement of Facts.

Marriage and Children
Mr. Barney and Ms. Black married on June 6, 1974, and divorced
on November 16, 1997, a marriage of over 23 years.

R. 833.

The

parties have five children born as issue of the marriage, three of
whom were minors at the time of the divorce.
5

R. 2.

Education and Employment of the Parties
Mr. Barney completed three years of his bachelor's degree and
Ms. Black attended some college prior to their marriage.

After

their marriage in June 1974, Mr. Barney was accepted to dental
school beginning with the 1974-1975 school year.

Mr. Barney's

first year of dental school was accepted as credit for the fourth
year of his bachelor's degree and he was awarded his bachelor of
science degree in 1975. Mr. Barney's dental schooling was paid for
by the United States Air Force through a health professional
scholarship, which included the payment of books, tuition, fees and
a $400.00 per month stipend.

Both parties worked part-time jobs

during the dental schooling to supplement their income. Mr. Barney
was awarded his dental degree in 1978. Mr. Barney pursued advanced
training and was awarded a certificate in periodontics in 1984. R.
841-2.
At the time the parties began having children, the parties
agreed that Ms. Black would stay at home to care for the children
and the household.
or

seek

employment

Ms. Black did not pursue additional education
during

the marriage

although

she worked

sporadically in Mr. Barney's dental practice substituting for
regular office employees and as a dental assistance as occasion
required.

Ms. Black also assisted Mr. Barney in setting up and

decorating his office.

R. 842-3.

Mr. Barney continues to practice as a periodontist in Bozeman,
Montana, earning an average of $13,500.00 per month after business
6

expenses but before the payment of personal income and other
employment taxes. R. 850.
At the time of trial, Ms. Black was living in Ogden, Utah, and
was enrolled in college.

R. 850. Ms. Black moved to St. George,

Utah, in July 1999, and is apparently neither enrolled in school
nor employed.

R. 934.

Ms. Black suffers from no disability

preventing her from working.

R. 993, pp. 66-70.

During the

pendency of the action before the trial court, Ms. Black was twice
held in contempt for not securing employment.

R. 284-91 and R.

503-14.
Inheritance
During the course of the marriage, Ms. Black received an
inheritance

in

the

amount

of

installments from 1988 to 1996.

$125,000.00

paid

in

several

All of the money was commingled

with the parties1 marital assets and/or used to pay marital
expenses.

R. 839-40.

Lifestyle and Financial Irresponsibility of the Parties During the
Marriage
During the first years of the marriage, while Mr. Barney was
attending dental school, the parties enjoyed, as he describes it,
a "macaroni and cheese and hot dog lifestyle."

After dental

school, Mr. Barney served in the United States Air Force for 13
years and enjoyed a "middle or upper middle class lifestyle"
earning a maximum of $50,000.00 per year.

After leaving the

military and entering into private practice and while living in
7

Bozeman, Montana, and Ogden, Utah, the parties lived "high off the
hog" and a "more lavish lifestyle than what was affordable." Both
parties testified that they had been fiscally irresponsible during
the last four or five years of the marriage.

R. 132-9.

Both the

domestic relations commissioner and the trial court judge found the
same.

R. 149 and R. 995, pp. 41-42.

The trial court found that

the parties lived an "extravagant and expensive lifestyle" and that
the lifestyle could not be maintained after divorce.

R. 850-2.

Divorce Decree
In the Divorce Decree, the trial court, among other things,
ordered the following:
The parties were awarded joint legal custody of the three
minor children with Ms. Black being awarded primary physical
custody

and

visitation.

Mr.

Barney

being

awarded

reasonable

rights

of

R. 813-7.

Ms. Black was awarded child support in the amount of $2,220.00
per month based on an extrapolation of the statutory child support
table. R. 821-2. The parties were ordered to equally pay the outof-pocket medical and dental costs incurred for the benefit of the
minor children.

R. 817.

Ms. Black was awarded alimony in the amount of $2,000.00 per
month for five years from the date of trial and $3,000.00 per month
thereafter.

R. 822-3.

The trial court did not make a specific

finding on Ms. Black's reasonable financial needs other than to
state that her need, based on the extravagant lifestyle the parties
8

attempted to live during the last few years of the marriage, was
greater than Mr. Barney's ability to pay.

R. 850.

In the event Ms. Black remarried or cohabited at any time
within five years from the date of trial, alimony would be reduced
to $1,500.00 per month and increased to $2,000.00 per month
thereafter.

This alimony would not terminate on remarriage.

R.

823. The trial court held all alimony would terminate on the death
of either party or after 23 % years from the time of divorce.

R.

824.
The

parties

equitably

divided

their

personal property

including furniture, furnishings and vehicles. R. 817. Mr. Barney
was awarded his dental practice at a total value of $4 0,000.00. R.
818.

Ms. Black was awarded the marital residence at a value of

$24,455.00 and Mr. Barney was awarded a duplex at a value of
$16,000.00.

R. 818-9 and 837-8.

Both real properties have been

lost by the parties to foreclosure.

Each party was awarded one

half of an IRA with a total value of approximately $3,600.00. R.
819.
Mr. Barney was ordered to pay the federal and state income
taxes, penalties and interest owing to the Internal Revenue Service
and the State of Wyoming in the amount of $75,483.00. R. 819-20.
Ms. Black was awarded attorney fees and costs through the time
of trial in the amount of $15,655.62. R. 824-5.

The trial court

denied Ms. Black's motion to be awarded additional post-trial
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $15,892.00. R. 825.
9

The Court awarded Ms. Black a judgment against Mr. Barney for
the following amounts:
$11,882.26
-4,759.05

Offsets awarded Mr. Barney

5,562.44

Contingent amounts awarded to Ms. Black
in the event the marital residence was
not lost to foreclosure

8,000.00

One-half of the value of the duplex
property awarded to Mr. Barney

20,000.00

One half of the value of the dental
practice awarded to Mr. Barney

15.655.62

Attorney fees and costs awarded to Ms.
Black

$56,341.27
R. 825-30.

Judgment for temporary alimony

Total judgment amount

In that the marital residence was lost to foreclosure,

the $5,562.44 amount is no longer a part of the judgment.
Bankruptcy
Mr. Barney continues to attempt to work through his financial
difficulties in an effort to avoid having to file for bankruptcy.
Ms. Black filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy at approximately the time
the divorce action was initially commenced.
1999, Ms. Black

filed

a second

R. 821.

bankruptcy

under

On July 1,
chapter 13

primarily in order to eliminate the attorney fees owed to her trial
counsel, Steve S. Christensen.

R. 93 3.

Mr. Christensen filed a

claim in the bankruptcy and Ms. Black objected to the claim.

The

judge in the bankruptcy case reduced Mr. Christensen's claim to
$5,000.00.

That order has not yet been entered by the bankruptcy
10

court and will undoubtedly be appealed by Mr. Christensen.

The

trial court in this divorce action may have to re-visit the issue
of the award of attorney fees once an order is entered by the
bankruptcy court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Ms. Black
nonterminable alimony.

Mr. Barney does not appeal the award of

alimony or the amount of the alimony awarded.

None of the trial

court's findings regarding nonterminable alimony provide a factual
or legal basis for the award.

Accordingly, alimony should have

terminated on the remarriage of Ms. Black.
The trial court abused its discretion in the amount of child
support awarded

to Ms. Black.

At

trial, evidence must be

introduced to establish the reasonable needs of the children before
the trial court can award child support greater than the highest
table amount.

The trial court entered only conclusory findings

regarding the needs of the children.

In addition, although

required under Utah case law, the trial court did not use linear
extrapolation to calculate the amount of child support awarded.
Accordingly, child

support

should

be awarded

at the highest

statutory table amount.
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Ms. Black
judgments in favor of Ms. Black in the amounts of: (i) $8,000.00
representing one-half of the value of the duplex real property
awarded to Mr. Barney; and (ii) $20,000.00 representing one-half of
11

the value of the dental practice awarded to Mr. Barney.

These

judgments were awarded based on factors which cannot be legally
supported.

Accordingly, the judgment amounts should be vacated.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY AWARDING MS. BLACK
NONTERMINABLE ALIMONY

The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Ms. Black
nonterminable alimony, that is alimony that continues despite her
remarriage. Mr. Barney does not appeal the award of alimony or the
amount of alimony awarded.

Rather, Mr. Barney appeals the trial

court's order that alimony survives Ms. Black's remarriage, which
occurred on May 15, 1999.
The presumption that alimony terminates upon the remarriage of
the recipient spouse is firmly rooted in Utah law and common sense.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) provides, in relevant part:
Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the* remarriage
or death of that former spouse.
Utah

Code Ann.

§

30-3-5 (8) (1999) .

In

fact, the

issue

of

nonterminable alimony has been before this Court previously in
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App 1993).

In Johnson,

this Court considered the issue of nonterminable alimony under
facts and circumstances very similar to those present in this case.

12

In Johnson, this Court, in interpreting Section 30-3-5(8), stated
as follows:
Alimony is presumed to terminate upon the
remarriage of the receiving spouse. Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(5) (1989), states that ,f[u]nless
a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party
pay alimony to a former spouse automatically
terminates upon the remarriage of the former
spouse." The trial court therefore has the
discretion to make an award of alimony that
will survive the marriage of the receiving
spouse.
In exercising this discretion,
however, the trial court must make adequate
and specific findings of fact justifying such
an award. Such an award must also comply with
the relevant legal principles governing
alimony awards.
Id. at 252.
The Johnson trial court relied on two findings to support its
award of nonterminable alimony.

First, the trial court found that

nonterminable alimony was awarded to assist in the support of the
receiving

spouse, Ms. Johnson.

This

Court

indicated

that

"[sjtanding alone, however, it is not a sufficient reason to extend
alimony payments beyond the remarriage of the receiving spouse. To
allow nonterminable awards to be based on this justification alone
would violate the statutory presumption against such awards, since
every alimony award is necessarily based upon this justification."
Id.

Therefore, as an undisputed matter of law, a recipient

spouse's

need

for

alimony

does

nonterminable alimony.

13

not

support

an

award

of

The Johnson trial court's other rationale for the award of
nonterminable alimony was to allow Ms. Johnson to "share in the
benefits of [Mr. Johnson's] professional status." Id. This Court
determined that this was just another way of saying that Ms.
Johnson was to share in Mr. Johnson's professional degree.

This

Court held that "[i]nasmuch as it is legally impermissive to grant
a share or interest of one spouse's professional degree or license
to another spouse upon divorce, it is likewise impermissible to
award nonterminable alimony on a finding that one spouse is
entitled

to

share

in

professional degree or

the

benefits

license."

of

the

other

Id. at 253.1

spouse's

This Court

concluded therefore, that the trial court's award of nonterminable
alimony on these facts constituted an abuse of discretion.
Like the trial court in Johnson. the trial court in this case
abused its discretion by failing to make findings which legally
support its award of nonterminable alimony.

As will be clearly

shown

findings

below,

none

of

the

trial

court's

regarding

nonterminable alimony provide factual or legal support for the
award. As such, the award of nonterminable alimony must be vacated
as a matter of law.

In Johnson, this Court relied on the well settled law of Utah that a
professional degree or license is not marital property to be divided at
divorce. See Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) and
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991).

14

The trial court in this case made fifteen written findings
which, at least ostensibly, relate to the award of alimony.2

In

finding no. 43, the trial court found as follows:
a.

Although the Petitioner was pursuing a
college degree at the time of the
parties1 marriage, she set aside her
personal and educational pursuits in
order to raise five children, to be at
home with them, to maintain the household
and to enable and assist Respondent in
obtaining his professional degree as well
as develop his professional skills.

b.

The Petitioner devoted all of
attention to raising the family
supporting the Respondent during
twenty three years of marriage to
Respondent.

c.

Both parties had approximately equal
earning
capacity,
education
and
experience going into the marriage.
During the marriage, Petitioner was not
able to advance her earning ability
because of her support of the family and
of Respondent's professional education
and business.

d.

Respondent was able to obtain a dental
degree, a graduate degree in dentistry,
acquire seventeen (17) years of dental
experience and establish his own private
practice, giving him the earning ability
of $13,500.00 a month, all with the
support of the Petitioner.

e.

Both parties were equal contributors in
advancing
Respondent's
educational
training.

her
and
her
the

On February 1, 1999, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision
awarding the nonterminable alimony. The findings in the Memorandum Decision
are similar, although not identical, to the specific findings that were
included in the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. The Memorandum
Decision is included as Exhibit C in the Addendum.

15

Petitioner
assisted
practice when needed.

in

the dental

Petitioner has minimal earning capacity
and no marketable skills.
It is not
likely given her age of forty three (43)
years that Petitioner will ever attain
the skills or earning capacity to support
herself at the standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage.
Petitioner contributed $125,000.00 of her
inheritance into the marriage.
The parties spent all of the money that
Respondent earned. The parties are left
with virtually no assets to be divided
among them at the end of the marriage.
The parties have no retirement benefits
or savings other than an IRA.
Petitioner
is entitled
to
a nonterminable award of alimony because of
her
contribution
to
Respondent's
increased earning capacity during the
marriage.
The only way to provide the Petitioner a
compensating
adjustment
for
her
contribution to the greatly enhanced
earning capacity of the Respondent is to
award her non-terminable alimony.
Non-terminable alimony will be necessary
to maintain Petitioner at a standard of
living similar to that which existed
during the marriage.
This award of alimony is not an award of
any interest in the professional degree
of Respondent. Respondent's income from
his practice may change without affecting
the amount of alimony he pays to the
Petitioner.
Respondent has the ability to pay nonterminable alimony which is less than the
16

court ordered alimony in paragraphs 3 6
and 41 above.
The trial court's findings with respect to nonterminable
alimony fall into several categories, none of which legally support
the award.
Ms. Black's Need for Alimony
Findings c, g, i, j, and m relate to Ms. Black's need for
alimony.

The trial court noted the financial irresponsibility of

the parties, the finite earning capacity of Ms. Black, and the
standard of living of the parties.
to Ms. Black's need for alimony.

Each one of these findings go
A recipient spouse's need for

alimony is relevant with respect to whether alimony is awarded or
not and, if so, at what amount. As indicated above, Mr. Barney is
appealing neither the award of alimony nor the amount. Mr. Barney
only appeals the trial court's determination that alimony would not
terminate upon Ms. Black's remarriage.
As this Court made absolutely clear in Johnson, to allow a
trial court to award nonterminable alimony on the basis of the
financial need of the recipient spouse alone "would violate the
statutory presumption against such awards, since every alimony
award is necessarily based upon this justification."

Id. at 252.

Therefore, the trial court's findings as to Ms. Black's need for
financial assistance cannot as a matter
nonterminable element of the alimony award.
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of

law support the

Mr. Barney's A b i l i t y t o Pay Alimony
In f i n d i n g o of paragraph 43, the t r i a l court found t h a t Mr,
Barney has t h e a b i l i t y t o pay nonterminable alimony.

This f i n d i n g

s u f f e r s from the same d e f i c i e n c y as the f i n d i n g s r e l a t i n g t o Ms.
B l a c k ' s need for alimony.

Every alimony award i s n e c e s s a r i l y based

on t h e payor s p o u s e ' s a b i l i t y t o pay alimony 3 .

Accordingly,

f a c t does not support an award of nonterminable alimony.

this

See i d .

Mr. Barney's Dental Degree and Training
Findings a, c, d, e, k,

1 and n a l l attempt t o j u s t i f y

the

award of nonterminable alimony on t h e b a s i s of Ms. B l a c k ' s i n t e r e s t
in Mr. Barney's dental degree and t r a i n i n g .
articulates

these

findings

in

terms

of

While t h e t r i a l court
Mr.

Barney's

"earning

c a p a c i t y , " t h e t r i a l court was in f a c t making a de f a c t o d i v i s i o n
of Mr. Barney's p r o f e s s i o n a l degree, which t h e law f o r b i d s .
Court's d e c i s i o n

i n Johnson l e f t

no doubt t h a t

it

is

"legally

impermissible" t o "award nonterminable alimony on a f i n d i n g
one spouse

is

entitled

spouse's professional

to

share

i n the b e n e f i t s

degree or l i c e n s e .

of

This

the

that
other

Such an award i s a de

The version of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7) (a) effective a t the time of t r i a l
provided:
The court s h a l l consider a t l e a s t the following
factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the
r e c i p i e n t spouse;
(ii) the r e c i p i e n t ' s earning capacity or a b i l i t y
to produce income;
( i i i ) the a b i l i t y of the payor spouse to provide
support;
(iv) the length of the marriage. Id.
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facto division of the professional degree or license." Xd at 253.
In the instant case, the trial court found that Ms. Black should
receive an award of nonterminable alimony because she assisted Mr.
Barney

in

obtaining

a

dental

degree

and

correspondingly, an increased earning capacity.

training,

and

In light of this

Court's holding in Johnson, the trial court's decision constitutes
a clear abuse of discretion.
The trial court's findings also fail to address the important
factual point that Mr. Barney largely supported the family during
dental school.

Mr. Barney's dental schooling was paid for by the

United States Air Force through health professional scholarships
including books, tuition, fees and $400.00 per month stipend.

R.

841-2.
Ms. Black's Educational and Career Development
In findings a, b, c, and g of paragraph 43, the trial court
found that Mr. Barney and Ms. Black started out on even footing as
to education and earning capacity at the time of the marriage.
However, Ms. Black decided to not further pursue her education or
career but rather decided to stay at home and care for the children
of the parties.

The trial court's findings in this regard go

directly to Ms. Black's need for financial assistance in the form
of alimony.

The trial court's findings support a traditional

alimony award subject to termination upon remarriage, but under
this Court's decision in Johnson these findings cannot legally
support the extraordinary nonterminable component of the award.
19

Ms, Black's Assistance in the Dental Practice
In finding f of paragraph 43, the trial court found that Ms.
Black's involvement in the dental practice, when needed, was a
relevant factor.

The trial court's finding in this regard is

relevant to the division of marital property and debt but not
nonterminable alimony.

As will be discussed infra in greater

detail, the trial court made an inequitable division of martial
property and debt in favor of Ms. Black. This division included a
valuation of the dental practice.

Therefore, Ms. Black received

double compensation for her contribution to the dental practice.
She was first compensated in the form of income derived from the
practice and consumed by the parties during the course of the
marriage.

She was then compensated again in the division of the

parties' property and debts, which was grossly inequitable.
After division of the parties' property and debts, Mr. Barney
was left with a mountain of debt and his professional degree. The
trial court has attempted to distribute a portion of his degree to
Ms. Black in the form of nonterminable alimony.

This Court's

decision in Johnson clearly indicates that Utah law forbids the
trial court from engaging in a de facto division of a professional
degree through nonterminable alimony.4
4

The disparity in earing

See Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987); see also
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991) (overturned award of equitable
restitution based on medical degree); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081
(Utah 1988) (benefit of wife's investment in husband was adequately reflected
in a greater property settlement and higher alimony); Ravburn v. Ravburn, 738
P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987) (disparity in income due to license is adequately
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capacity between Mr. Barney and Ms. Black may be addressed through
a traditional alimony analysis and equitable property division but
not through an award of nonterminable alimony.
Paragraph n of the trial court's findings states that "this
award

of

alimony

is not

an

award

professional degree of Respondent."

of

any

interest

in the

In fact, the nonterminable

alimony component of the alimony award was a de facto division of
Mr. Barney's professional degree. Merely because the trial court
calls a spade a club does not make it a club.

The above cited

findings of the trial support a traditional award of alimony that
terminates upon the recipient spouse's remarriage.

This is the

correct result and the result that the law requires in this case.
In summary, Mr. Barney does not appeal the alimony award or
the

amount.

Mr.

Barney

only

appeals

the

trial

court's

extraordinary award of nonterminable alimony because it has no
basis in fact or law.

The trial court was required to make

findings which might support the extraordinary order that alimony
does not terminate upon remarriage. The trial court failed to make
such

findings

and

therefore

abused

its

discretion.

nonterminable component of the alimony award must be vacated.

addressed under traditional alimony analysis)
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The

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED
The trial court abused its discretion in the amount of child
support awarded on two grounds.
combined parental

First, in divorce actions where

income exceeds the highest statutory table

amount, evidence must be introduced to establish the reasonable
needs of the children before the trial court can award child
support greater than the highest table amount.

Ms. Black did not

introduce evidence regarding the reasonable needs of the children
and the trial court entered only conclusory findings regarding the
needs of the children.

Second, although required under Utah case

law, the trial court did not use linear extrapolation to calculate
the amount of child support.
A.

Ms. Black Did Not Establish the Reasonable Needs of the
Children.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 provides:
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds
the highest level specified in the table, an
appropriate and just child support amount
shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, but
the amount ordered may not be less than the
highest level specified in the table for the
number of children due support.

In interpreting this statutory provision, in Ball v. Peterson. 912
P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App 1996), this Court stated:
where the parties1 income exceeds the highest
monthly combined adjusted gross income listed
on the statutory table, linear extrapolation
of the child support obligation table alone is
not enough.
Strict reliance on linear
22

extrapolation would be erroneous, because
taken to the extreme, a child could be awarded
support vastly exceeding any reasonable need.
Rather, a trial judge must consider and make
specific findings on all "appropriate and
just" facts.
Id. at 1014; See also Reinhart v. Reinhart. 963 P.2d 757, 759-60
(Utah Ct. App 1998).

In Reinhart, this Court stated:

[I]n child support cases where parental income
exceeds the guidelines, the parties must
introduce evidence to establish the reasonable
needs of the children.
Id. at 760.
In the instant case, the trial court made the following
findings regarding the needs of the three minor children:
24. The
parties1
children
have become
accustomed to a high standard of living.
25. The parties1 children should be given
support at a minimum to allow them to continue
their lives with some semblance to what they
have had in the past.
26. The children should not
financially by this divorce.

be punished

27. The children can be and deserve to be
maintained at their accustomed standard of
living. They need higher child support than
the maximum provided by the statutory table.
28. Respondent is able to pay more child
support than would be required under statutory
guidelines.
R. 848.
First, with respect to findings 24, 25 and 27, the trial court
makes a vague reference that the children enjoyed a "high standard
of living" and "deserve to be maintained at their accustomed
23

standard of living." However, Ball and Reinhart do not allow child
support to be awarded based on the "standard of living" but rather
on the "needs of the children."

That distinction is critical in

this case due to fact that the trial court judge and the domestic
relations commissioner both found that the parties had been "both
financially

and

fiscally

irresponsible"

living

an

"extremely

extravagant lifestyle" well beyond their means. R. 149 and R. 995,
pp. 41-2.

In fact, the trial court judge in his bench ruling

stated:
Now when we are considering both child support
and alimony, it's very difficult for me to
determine what kind of a standard of living
that,
obviously
you
were
living
so
extravagantly that there is no way that
there's going to be money that you are going
to be able to maintain anywhere near the kind
of standard of living that either one of you
were living before.
Just can't do it.
There's not money there to do it with.
R. 995, p. 42.

The standard is the reasonable needs of the

children, not an unaffordable

extravagant

lifestyle that the

parties improvidently attempted to live.
Second,

Ball

and

Reinhart

require

a

qualitative

quantitative analysis of the children's reasonable needs.

or

Other

than the findings as noted above, the trial court made no findings
on the qualitative needs of the children and no evidence was
presented regarding the same.
Similarly, the trial court made no quantitative findings on
the reasonable needs of the children.
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It is further difficult to

marshal evidence from the record on the quantitative needs of the
children, in that no evidence was presented on that issue.

The

only evidence which comes close is the testimony of Ms. Black on
her claimed financial needs. Ms. Black introduced exhibit no. 4 0
as to her living expenses and testimony was elicited from her
regarding the same. R. 993, pp. 26-31 and 59-78; R. 994, pp. 4712.
It is clear from reviewing exhibit no. 40 and the portions of
the transcript noted above that the parties were paying exorbitant
amounts for basic living expenses.

For example, housing costs

including the mortgage payment, taxes, insurance, maintenance and
utilities, totaled more than $3,712.00 per month.

Similarly, Ms.

Black claimed $715.00 per month for transportation costs for one
vehicle and $750.00 per month for food costs for four people.
Noticeably, however, Ms. Black included no amounts in exhibit no.
40 for special expenses for the children other than that of their
pro-rata share of the expenses listed.

The children were not

privileged in receiving and the parties were not paying for such
items as private schooling, special educational needs, lessons,
extra-curricular activity costs, exotic travel, and lavish gifts.
In essence, during the marriage of the parties, the children
experienced a very customary lifestyle enjoyed by other children of
the general populace.

The reasonable needs of the children

experiencing such a lifestyle can be supported by a standard award
of child support at the highest table amount.
25

Third, in finding no. 26, the trial court found that the
children should not be punished financially by this divorce. While
Mr. Barney agrees with that statement, such is not a factor that
the trial court can or should consider for the reason that the
statement also holds true for Mr. Barney.

An "appropriate and

just" award of child support based on relevant factors is the task
before the trial court, not a determination of who should and
should not be punished financially because of the divorce.
Finally, in finding no. 28, the trial court found that Mr.
Barney had the ability to pay more child support than would be
required under statutory guidelines.

However, in isolation, that

finding is insufficient to permit an award of child support above
the highest table amount. In Reinhart, the former wife brought an
action against the former husband seeking upward modification of
the child support award based on the increase of the husband's
gross monthly income.

In Reinhart. this Court stated:

[A] demonstration of an increcise in the
obligor's income alone is not sufficient to
increase the child support order.
The
increase in ability to pay must be considered
in light of the children's actual needs in
fashioning an "appropriate and just" child
support award under section 78-45-7.12.
Id. at 760.

In the instant case, finding no. 28 has no relevance

on this issue unless the court also determines the reasonable needs
of the children, which the trial court utterly failed to do.
In

summary, Ms. Black

failed

to

introduce

establish the reasonable needs of the children.
26

evidence

to

The trial court

failed to consider and make specific findings on all "appropriate
and just11 factors. Accordingly, the child support award should be
set at no more than the highest table amount.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Use an Acceptable Method of Linear
Extrapolation to Calculate the Amount of the Child Support
Award.
Assuming arguendo

that it is proper in this case for the trial

court to award child support above the highest table amount, the
trial

court

did

not

use

an

acceptable

method

of

linear

extrapolation to calculate the amount of the child support award.
Linear extrapolation presupposes the use of an accepted method of
linear regression analysis, such as the "least squares" method, or
using the actual formula incorporated into the statutory child
support tables.
In conjunction with the admission of exhibit no. 15, Mr.
Barney presented evidence and proposed that child support be based
on gross monthly incomes of $893.00 for Ms. Black and $10,000.00
for Mr. Barney.

Based on those incomes, the child support award

would be $1,660.00 per month.
In its ruling, the trial court did not use a linear regression
analysis to calculate the amount of child support to be paid by Mr.
Barney.

Rather, the trial court employed a simple ratio method by

calculating the percentage of child support Mr. Barney would pay if
his income were $10,000.00 (and Ms. Black had imputed income of
$893.00) and then used that same percentage, 16.6%, and applied it
to the gross monthly income the trial court ultimately found Mr.
27

Barney to be earning in the amount of $13,500.00.

This ratio

method results in child support of approximately $2,220.00 per
month.

R. 849.

The trial court did not take any evidence on acceptable
methods of linear regression analysis.

Using the "least squares"

method of linear regression would, for example, result in a child
support award less than the amount actually awarded by the trial
court. When multiplied by the number of years that Mr. Barney will
be paying child support., the error of the trial court is compounded
to substantial dollar amounts.
In summary, the trial court abused its discretion in the
amount of child support awarded to Ms. Black.

The trial court

failed to make specific findings to establish that the reasonable
needs of the children necessitated an award of child support
greater than the highest table amount.

Moreover, the trial court

used an improper method of extrapolation. This Court should vacate
the trial court's improper award and set child support consistent
with the highest level of the statutory table.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN AWARDING MS. BLACK JUDGMENTS FOR
ONE HALF OF THE VALUE OF CERTAIN
PROPERTY AWARDED TO MR. BARNEY
Utah law requires that a trial court distribute property in a
divorce in a fair and systematic fashion.
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App 1993).
28

See Burt v. Burt. 799

The overriding consideration

is that the

division be "equitable."

Id. at 1171.

Utah law

presumes that each party is entitled to all of his or her separate
property and fifty percent of the marital property. See Hall v.
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also Burt v. Burt,
799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

"[0]nce a court makes a

finding that a specific item is marital property, the law presumes
that it will be shared equally between the parties unless unusual
circumstances,
otherwise."
deviation

memorialized

in

adequate

Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022.

findings,

require

Therefore, a trial court's

from an equal division of marital property

is an

extraordinary division that requires unusual circumstances and the
trial court to make appropriate findings.
Utah law addresses the division of debt in a similar fashion.
The trial court must first characterize, as either separate or
marital, the debt present at the time of trial.

The trial court

must then divide the debt between the parties in a fair and
equitable manner. See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23
(Utah 1980); see also Sinclair v. Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396 (Utah
1986).

The division of marital debt differs from the division of

marital property in so much as the law does not presume that the
division of debt must be "equal" to be "equitable". Id. The trial
court must then make findings, however, on the impact the division
of debt has on the payor spouse's ability to pay alimony.
Wilev v. Wiley, 866 P.2d 547, 551-52 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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See

In the instant case, the trial court's division of the marital
property5 and debt was undeniably grossly unequal. As described in
the following table, the total net value of the marital property
and debt was only $8,572.00.

If the trial court had equally

divided the marital property and debt, each party would have
received $4,286.00 ($8,572.00 -s- 2) of net value.

However, Ms.

Black was awarded property and debt with a positive net value of
$26,255.00 and Mr. Barney was awarded property and debt with a
negative net value of $<17,683.00>.

Accordingly, Ms. Black was

awarded $21,969.00 more in net value as compared to which she would
have received if there had been an equal division ($26,255.00 $4,286.00), The trial court then also properly considered the
impact of assigning Mr. Barney all of the tax debt and made
allowance for such in the amount of alimony awarded.

R. 851.

Although grossly unequal, Mr. Barney does not necessarily claim
that the division was inequitable.

However, the trial court did

not stop there.
Surprisingly, and without any factual or legal explanation,
the trial court also awarded judgment against Mr. Barney in favor
of Ms. Black for one-half of the value of the property he was
awarded.

The judgments were in the amount of

(i) $8,000.00,

constituting one-half the net value of the duplex awarded to Mr.

5

0ther items of property such as the furniture, furnishings and vehicles
were divided by the parties on an equitable basis and the trial court approved
the same.
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Barney; and (ii) $20,000.00, constituting one-half the total value
of the dental practice awarded to Mr. Barney.
The division of the property and debt by the trial court as
well as the award of the judgments is illustrated as follows:
Total
Value
Property and Debt Elements
Dental Practice
Marital Residence
(net equity)
Duplex (net equity)
IRA
Taxes
Subtotal

$40,000
$24,455
3,600
<75.483>
8,572

Judgment Elements
Amount for duplex
Amount for dental practice
TOTAL

Awarded to
Ms. Black

$ 8.572

Awarded to
Mr. Barney
$40,000
24,455

16,000
1,800

16,000
1,800
<75.483>

26,255

<17,683>

8,000
20.000

<8,000>
<20.000>

$54.255

$<45.683>

The trial court's rationale in making such an unequal division
of the marital property and debt as well as the award of $28,000.00
of judgments was: (i) Ms. Black's contribution of her inheritance
to the marriage; (ii) Mr. Barney's assumed ability to pay the tax
debt in the future; and (iii) both parties having consumed, better
stated wasted, all marital property so that there was literally no
property to award either party at the time of trial.
56-8 and R. 996, pp. 55-60.

R. 995, pp.

As discussed above, the trial court

relied on these same factors to support the award of nonterminable
alimony.
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While the trial court's division of marital property and debt
such that Ms. Black received a positive value of $26,2 55.00 and Mr.
Barney received a negative value of $<17/683.00>

is cause for

concern, the trial court's additional award of judgments in the
amounts of $8,000.00 and $20,000.00 lacks any intelligible legal
foundation.

The trial court attempted to justify such on the same

basis used to make its unsupportable award of nonterminable alimony.
The trial court's division of property and debt, particularly in
light of $28,000.00 of judgments that were awarded out of the thin
air, is not only inequitable it offends any sense of justice or
reason.
The only possible explanation for the trial court's grossly
inequitable division of marital property and debt is that the trial
court considered the value of the dental practice that was proffered
by Ms. Black.

Ms. Black's appraiser valued the dental practice at

$227,000,000 which included goodwill.

Despite Mr. Barney's Motion

in Limine and objections at trial to exclude the consideration of
goodwill, the trial court referred to Ms. Black's ascribed value in
paragraph 8(c) of the trial court's findings by stating "there was
substantial evidence that the dental practice has the value assigned
by Petitioner's appraiser of two hundred twenty seven thousand
dollars ($227,000.00) which included goodwill."

The trial court's

apparent consideration of that value was clear error.

This Court

has made it clear that Utah law does not permit the valuation of a
sole practitioner's practice unless the professional has retired and
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sold the practice.

See Sorenson v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774, 775-76

(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In summary, the trial court's award of judgments for one half
of the value of certain property awarded to Mr. Barney constituted
a grossly inequitable property division and lacks any intelligible
basis in law.

The judgments should be vacated.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Barney respectfully requests this
Court to order that (i) Ms. Black's alimony award terminate on
remarriage; (ii) child support be awarded at the highest statutory
table amount; and (iii) the judgments in the amounts of $8,000.00
and $20,000.00, entered as a part of the property division of the
trial court, be vacated.
DATED: April 3, 2000
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

DEAN C. ANDREASEN
MATTHEW A. STEWARD
Attorneys for
Respondent/Appellant/Cross Appellee
V. Craig Barney
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and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed,
postage prepaid, first-class, to:
Cherise Roundy (Barney) Black
55 East 700 South, #56

St. George, UT 84770
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Steve S. Christensen (6156)
Attorneys for Petitioner
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 322-0591
Facsimile: (801)322-0592
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHERISEROUNDY,

Petitioner,

vs.

FINDING OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW

JUN

Civil No. 974900793 DA
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

V.CRAIG BARNEY,

Respondent.
Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce was heard on October 27, 1998 and October
29, 1998 before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, District Judge presiding.
Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney Steve S. Christensen.
Respondent was present and represented by his attorney Dean Andreasen.
The court having received and considered all of the evidence presented by way of
testimony and exhibits and having reviewed all memoranda and arguments presented by
both attorneys, now enters its:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PARTIES HAVE STIPULATED AND AGREED AS FOLLOWS

AND THAT THIS STIPULATION IS REASONABLE AND IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR
CHILDREN:

1.

The parties were married on June 6, 1974 and were divorced by way of an

order of Bifurcation November 16, 1997.
2.

The parties will share joint legal custody of the minor children. Petitioner

will have the primary physical custody, care and control of the minor children, subject to
reasonable rights of visitation of the Respondent described as follows:
a.

Petitioner will always have the children during the first half of the
Christmas vacation including Christmas day. The Respondent will have the
second half of the Christmas vacation including News Years Day. This
way the children will not have to travel on Christmas Day.

b.

Petitioner will always have the children during the Easter Holiday and
during the Utah Spring Break.

c.

The Respondent will have the children during the UEA break that they have
from school in the fall each year. He will also have the children for Labor
day and Memorial Day.

Findings of Fact and Conclusion o f Law
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d.

Petitioner will always have the children for the 24th of July, as they do not
celebrate this in Montana.

e.

Respondent will always have the children during the week of the 4th of
July. He has the option to use some of his summer vacation during that
time. He has a total of four weeks he can spend with the children during
the summer. Basketball camps in Montana will be taken into consideration
as these are important to the children.

f.

Respondent will have the children for Thanksgiving during the ODD years.

g.

Petitioner will have the children for Thanksgiving during the EVEN years,

h.

Tht panics vull try to cooperate with one amothn in Ihc stiiiiiiici months
and try to get the children to participate in extended family reunions
whenever possible. Trading July 4th or July 24th to allow for family
reunions will be acceptable. If a family reunion conflict exists in the
summer, the parties will alternate taking the children: Petitioner will have
the children during the 1st conflict time and Respondent will have the next,
etc.

i.

Respondent has the option of scheduling his visitation on 3-day weekends if
it works into his schedule, so he will be able to see the children longer on

Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law

Page 3

834

his trips to Utah. Petitioner has second option on 3-day weekends (except
Labor Day and Memorial Day, which Respondent already has.) If Cherise
desires to have the children on one of these minor holiday weekends, for a
special event, then Respondent will try to arrange a different time to see the
children that month. Petitioner will let Respondent know of any such
problems as soon as possible. Respondent will try to be as flexible with
these minor holiday changes as his work schedule permits.
j.

On months that do not have minor holidays, Petitioner will permit the
children to miss one day of school on a Monday to visit with Respondent,
provided he calls the school and arranges it with them. Respondent must
also have the children bring their schoolwork with them so they can return
to school on Tuedsay and not be behind.

k.

Respondent will provide a proposed summer schedule by the prior April 15
which will give Petitioner time to arrange any desired changes. Petitioner
will have until April 30 to reply to the summer schedule. The parties will
submit any dispute they cannot resolve regarding visitation to mediation
with the parties sharing the costs thereof initially. The ultimate cost of
mediation may be allocated differently by the court.
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1.

Annie will arrange her own exceptions to this schedule with Respondent.
The other children will also have therightto work things out with
Respondent if there are conflicting school activities.

m.

Respondent w ill try to give Petitioner visitation schedules at least six
months but not more than one year in advance. Respondent has already
submitted his proposed schedule for 1999 attached as Exhibit 'A'.

n.

Petitioner will always have two weeks to agree to or to suggest changes to
any visitation schedule Respondent sends her. This two week time period
will beginfromthe day Petitioner first receives the visitation schedule by
certified mail. If Petitioner does not pick up the certified mail, it will be
presumed that she received it five days after Respondent's mailing is post
marked.

o.

Family emergencies, Weddings, Funerals, etc. will take precedence over
the visitation schedule. Respondent and Petitioner will work together to
allow each other as much notice as possible for these things. Respondent
will make all changes in the visitation schedule in writing 45 days in
advance. Petitioner will have two weeks to reply to suggested changes.
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p.

The parties shall implement, as applicable, the advisory guidelines set forth
in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-33, a photocopy of which is attached as
Exhibit C B\

3.

The parties have stipulated that the personal property has been evenly

divided and the parties will each retain the personal property presently in thenpossession, except that the Respondent will be awarded the hot tub, together with the
electrical box, stairs and accessories for the hot tub, installed at the Ogden property.
4.

The parties' daughter, Angelina Cherise Barney, age 17, is driving one of

the parties' vehicles. The parties agree to give title to such vehicle to their daughter,
Angelina, within thirty days of the signing of this order.
5.

The parties agree to the value of their real property as appraised as follows:

The value of the marital residence in Ogden, Utah is two hundred sixty eight thousand
dollars ($268,000.00) and the value of the Bozeman, Montana duplex is two hundred and
six thousand dollars ($206,000.00).
6.

The parties stipulate that the payoffs on the mortgages as of October 26,

1998 are as follows: The payoff on the Ogden home is two hundred forty three thousand
five hundred forty four dollars and sixty seven cents ($243,544.67) and the payoff on the
Montana duplex is one hundred and ninety thousand dollars ($190,000.00) as of October
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31, 1998. The equity at the time of trial in the duplex is sixteen thousand dollars
($16,000.00). The equity at the time of trial in the marital residence in Ogden, Utah was
twenty four thousand four hundred fifty five dollars thirty three cents ($24,455.33) minus
all costs necessary to get that residence out of foreclosure, including but not limited to
property taxes, late fees, interest, attorney's fees and court costs.
7.

The parties stipulate that the Respondent will provide a health insurance

program for the minor children of the parties covering hospital doctor, medical expense
incurred by the children. The cost of this insurance will be evenly divided between the
parties. Further, the parties will each pay one-half of all out-of-pocket reasonable and
necessary medical, dental and orthodontia expenses paid to arid lor third parties and not
covered by said insurance.
8.

This stipulation is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the minor

children.
B.

THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED

AT TRIAL:

Life Insurance
1.

Respondent is able to and should maintain the two hundred fifty thousand

dollar ($250,000.00) life insurance policy on his life now in effect for the benefit of the
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Petitioner and the minor children of the parties, naming the Petitioner as the beneficiary.
After child support terminates, then life insurance should be maintained for the benefit of
Petitioner with the face amount of one hundred twenty five thousand dollars
($125,000.00) during the period of time Respondent may be liable for alimony.
INHERITANCE

2.

Petitioner received an inheritance of one hundred and twenty five thousand

dollars ($125,000.00) from her grandfather during the marriage.
3.

The petitioner's inheritance from her grandfather was commingled by her

with the parties' marital assets and was not maintained as her separate property:
a.

Fifty three thousand dollars ($53,000.00) of that inheritance came in

small amounts spread over time between 1988 and 1996.
b.

In 1991, Mrs. Roundy received a lump sum distribution of forty
seven thousand dollars ($47,000.00) of her inheritance which was
commingled with the parties' marital assets and/or used to pay
marital family expenses.

c.

Finally, in 1996, Petitioner received an inheritance distribution of twenty

five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) which was commingled with the parties' marital assets
and/or used to pay marital family expenses. This inheritance was used in lieu of the four
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thousand dollars ($4,000.00) a month Respondent had otherwise taken from the practice
and given to Petitioner for the family's regular living expenses, including but not limited
to food, household items, gas, medical copayments, clothes, school expenses, gifts,
entertainment, travel, grooming and miscellaneous expenses.
Dental Practice
4.

The court finds that the tangible assets of the Respondent's dental practice

are marital property.
5.

The dental equipment is the only tangible asset of the dental practice and is

marital property. The current amount of dental practice accounts receivable approximate
the current amount of dental practice accounts payable as evidenced by Exhibit numbers
25 and 26 and, accordingly, net each other out. A list of the dental equipment is attached
as Exhibit ' C hereto, and made a part of these findings.
6.

The dental equipment has a current value of forty thousand dollars

($40,000.00). This is the value assigned to the equipment by Respondent.
7.

The present value of the dental equipment assets of the dental practice

should be evenly divided between the parties: twenty thousand dollars ($20,000 00) to
each party.

Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law

Page 9

840

8.

The court could not consider the following equities in dividing the dental

assets because of the decision of Sorenson v. Sorenson. 839 P2.d 774 (Utah 1992):
a.

Petitioner contributed all of her inheritance from her grandfather to

the family's expenses in lieu of taking funds from the dental practice for that purpose.
b.

The court does not find a specific value in regards to the dental

practice because of the decision in Sorenson v. Sorenson. 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992). The
court cannot consider the value of goodwill and reputation of Respondent's dental
practice. Although only forty thousand dollars ($40,000.00) of the value of the dental
practice is divisible as marital property, there was substantial evidence that the dental
practice has the value assigned by Petitioner's appraiser of two hundred twenty seven
thousand dollars ($227,000.00) which included goodwill.
c.

The parties have the following education and work experience:
i.

Respondent completed three years of his bachelor's degree
prior to the marriage,

ii.

Petitioner attended college prior to the marriage of the parties,

iii.

The parties were married in June 1974.

iv.

Respondent was accepted to dental school at the University of
Iowa beginning the 1974-1975 school year. Respondent's
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first year of dental school was accepted as credit for the
fourth year of his bachelor's program and he was awarded his
bachelor's of science degree in 1975.
v.

Respondent' s dental schooling at Iowa was paid for by the
United States Air Force through a health professional
scholarship. Respondent's books, tuition and fees were paid
and Respondent received a $400.00 per month stipend. Both
parties worked part-time jobs during schooling to supplement
the parties income.

vi.

Respondent was awarded his dental degree ml 978.

vii.

Respondent also attended the Oregon Health Science
University from 1982 to 1984 and was awarded a certificate
in periodontics in 1984.

viii.

Petitioner left her university studies in Utah to go with
Respondent to an out-of-state dental school.

ix.

At the time the parties began having children, the parties
agreed that Petitioner would stay home to care for the
children and the household. Petitioner spent twenty three
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years of the marriage supporting Respondent by caring for
Respondent, raising the parties' five children, and caring for
the household while Respondent pursued schooling and
developed his career. Petitioner stayed at home with the
children throughout the marriage and did not obtain formal
schooling or work experience.
x.

Petitioner has worked sporadically in Respondent's dental
practice substituting for regular office employees and as a
dental assistant when necessary. Petitioner also helped
Respondent set up and decorate his office.
Real Property

9.

The Montana duplex should be awarded to Respondent at a value of

$16,000.00. Respondent currently resides in the Montana duplex while Petitioner
resides in Ogden, Utah.
10.

The Montana duplex is marital property. One-half of the equity of the

Montana duplex should be awarded to Petitioner in the amount of eight thousand dollars
($8,000.00).
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11

There is not any value in tlic marital residence in Ogden, Utah because the

home went into foreclosure. Respondent has indicated that he desires to give a deed in
lieu of foreclosure to the current mortgagee which would result in no equity in that
property.
12.

However, the marital residence in Ogden, Utah should be awarded to

Petitioner in the event that she may be able to secure any assistance to save the home
from foreclosure. If any liens for marital debts are attached to the home, Respondent
should be ordered to pay such debts, hold Petitioner hannless from payment of such debts
and indemnify Petitioner relative to any payment she makes towards such debts on the
marital residence in Ogden, Utah.
IRA
13.

The IRA of the parties in the amount of three thousand dollars ($3,600.00)

held at Piper Jaffrey under account #522-12670-220 is marital property.
14.

The court finds that Respondent should pay and has paid one half of said

IRA account to Petitioner in the cash amount of approximately $1,800.00.
Debt Division
15.

Respondent should be ordered to pay all of the parties' past due Internal

Revenue Service debt for the years 1995 and 1996, to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom
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and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon. The IRS debt for 1995
is three thousand five hundred fourteen dollars ($3,514.00). The IRS debt for 1996 is
sixty two thousand three hundred twelve dollars ($62,312.00). All 1997 and 1998 taxes
were filed separately by the parties and each party is responsible for any tax debt on
income reported on such separate returns by him or her for those years.
16.

Respondent should be ordered to pay all of the parties' past due state tax

debts for the year 1996, to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner
for any payment she makes thereon. The Montana State Tax debt for 1995 is paid in full.
The Montana State Tax debt for 1996 is nine thousand six hundred fifty seven dollars
($9,657.00). All 1997 and 1998 taxes were filed separately by the parties and each party
is responsible for any tax debt on income reported on such separate returns by him or her
for those years.
17.

In reaching its finding that all tax debt payments should be made by

Respondent, the Court has considered the following factors, which the court also finds:
a.

The income from which the taxes are assessed was earned
Respondent;

b.

The Respondent alone has the earning ability to pay such tax
liability;
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c.

Petitionei contiibuted her inheritance of one hundred twenty five
thousand dollars ($125,000.00) to the marital estate;

d.

Respondent was primarily in control of the family finances during
the marriage while the taxes were bemg incurred

18.

The parties should each bear his or her own debt for the vehicle each is
driving as each party is awarded his or her vehicle.

19.

The parties should each pay the mortgages on the real property awarded to

him or her.
20.

If Petitioner is able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah,

Respondent will be responsible to pay current all real property taxes for all years prior to
and including 1998, in the amount of eighty eight hundred dollars ($8,800.00) plus
interest after October 31, 1998, in order to enable Petitioner to refinance such property,
consistent with the court's order from the January 11, 1999 hearing in this case II
Petitioner is not able to retain the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, Respondent should
be ordered to hold Petitioner harmless against collection of any delinquent real property
taxes on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah.
a

The temporary order of the court i equired Respondent to pay the real

property taxes on the martial residence in Ogden, Utah.
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b.

Respondent did not make the tax payments as ordered.

c.

Respondent alone has the ability to make the past due property

tax payments on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah.
21.

Respondent is ordered to pay all marital debt incurred prior to April 1997

not specifically addressed under paragraphs 15 through 20 above, to hold Petitioner
harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon.
Except as otherwise ordered by this court, Petitioner is ordered to pay all debts separately
incurred by her since her bankruptcy in 1998. Respondent is ordered to pay debts
separately incurred by him after March, 1997 in addition to the other debts assigned to
him by the court. This order of marital debt payment is made, considering the following
equities:
a.

The Respondent alone has the ability to pay such marital debts;

b.

Petitioner contributed her inheritance of one hundred twenty five
thousand dollars ($125,000.00) to the marriage;

c.

Respondent was primarily in control of the family finances during
the marriage while the marital debts were being incurred.

22.

The order that Respondent pay marital debt on behalf of the Petitioner is

made by way of further support and maintenance for the Petitioner and is not to be
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considered a property settlement. Respondent should be ordered to hold Petitioner
harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon.
Child Support
23.

The parties have three minor children1 Angelina Cherise, 12/21/82; Sandin

Craig, 9/18/85; and Fabione Sadie Marcella, 12/19/87. Respondent should pay support
for these children until each attains age 18 or graduates from highschool, whichever
occurs last.
24.

The parties' children have become accustomed to a high standard of living.

25.

The parties' children should be given support at a minimum to allow them

to continue their lives with some semblance to what they have had in I lie past.
26.

The children should not be punished financially by this divorce.

27.

The children can be and deserve to be maintained at their accustomed

standard of living. They need higher child support than the maximum provided b> the
statutory table.
28.

Respondent is able to pay more child support than would be required under

statutory guidelines.
29.

Respondent can and should pay an amount equal to sixteen point three

percent (16.6%) of his cuiTent pretax income as child support.
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30.

Respondent's gross income after he pays his business expenses is thirteen

thousand five hundred dollars ($13,500.00) per month average. Respondent should pay
child support of $2,220.00 a month, initially, calculated as follows:
a.

Using a sole custody worksheet, if Petitioner has a gross monthly
income of $893.00 and Respondent has the highest gross monthly
income on the table of $10,000.00, child support would be $1,660.00
or approximately 16.6 percent of the highest gross monthly income
on the child support table for Respondent. Extrapolating this
percentage to Respondent's actual gross monthly income of
$13,500.00 results in child support of approximately $2,220.00 per
month ($13,500.00 x 16.6 percent). Child support shall be
recomputed using the same methodology when there is a change in
circumstances under Utah law.

b.

Child support shall continue for a child until the child attains the age
of 18 years or graduates from high school with his or her regular
class, whichever is later.
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Alimony
31.

Although Petitioner is enrolled at Weber State University and is entitled to

pursue her education, it is not reasonably likely she will eventually be able to earn
sufficient income to support hei and her family in the lifestyle she enjoyed during the
parties' marriage.
32.

Petitioner has a need for alimony in an amount greater than Respondent has

the ability to pay.
a.

The parties lived an extravagant and expensive lifestyle.

b.

Petitioner does not have the ability to support herself at the same

expensive level she has had in the marriage.
33.

Respondent earns an average of thirteen thousand five hundred dollars

($13,500.00) in income each month after his business expenses.
34.

Respondent is self employed as a periodontist in Bozeman, Montana.

Although he closed his second office in Layton, Utah in 1997, Respondent continued to
make an income equivalent to or greater than the income he had with two practices.
35.

Respondent's ability to pay alimony to the Petitioner is limited by the

following:
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a.

Respondent should be required to pay income taxes for state, federal

and self employment on his entire income. The taxes on thirteen thousand
five hundred dollars ($13,500.00) a month, without any deduction for
alimony, will be four thousand eight hundred fifty five dollars ($4,855.00).
After Respondent pays these taxes he will have eight thousand six hundred
and sixty five dollars ($8,665.00) of disposable income each month.
b.

After Respondent pays two thousand two hundred and twenty dollars

($2,220.00) of child support, he will have six thousand four hundred and
forty five dollars ($6,445.00) of disposable income each month.
c.

Respondent can make payments of three thousand dollars

($3,000.00) per month to the IRS and other creditors in order to resolve the
unpaid marital obligations. After this payment, Respondent will have only
three thousand four hundred and forty five dollais ($3,445.00) of disposable
income each month.
d.

Respondent will be permitted one thousand four hundred forty five

($1,445.00) a month for his own needs and living expenses.
36.

Respondent's ability to pay alimony presently is limited to two thousand

dollars ($2,000.00) per month for five years because of the debt responsibilities the court
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has assigned to Respondent. Respondent should be ordered to pay alimony of two
thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month for five years.
37.

Respondent submitted expenses of $3,700.00 a month as his reasonable

living expenses and needs in Trial Exhibit 14. The court specifically finds that of the
amount claimed, $100.00 a month will be paid by Petitioner as her share of the children's
health insurance premium. The Respondent's visitation trip to see the children will not
be necessary because under paragraph 54 below the court will permit the children to
travel to Montana by bus. For three children to travel to Montana by bus, Respondent's
cost will be $240.00 a month.
38.

Even if Respondent's reasonable living expenses and needs are equivalent

to the remaining three thousand three hundred forty dollars ($3,340.00) which
Respondent claims in Trial Exhibit 14, the court finds that he has sufficient income to
provide for those needs.
39.

Any funds needed for Respondent's reasonable needs and living expenses

in addition to the living expenses allowed by the court in subparagraph 35(d) above, may
be taken from discretionary expenses in his business that will no longer be needed,
including the income that had previously gone to the following: Travel to and
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expenses for Respondent's Layton office, attorneys fees for the divorce, off-site
accoimting expenses, travel to and expenses for implantation courses and Respondent's
practice's automobile.
40.

After five years from the date of the entry of decree, Respondent will have

an increased ability to pay additional alimony. Respondent has the ability to pay off
Internal Revenue Service auearage and other marital debts within five years which pay
off will reduce his expenses by three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) a month.
41.

After five years from the date of the entry of decree, Respondent should be

ordered to increase his alimony payments to a total alimony payment of three thousand
dollars ($3,000.00) per month because he will have an additional ability to pay alimony
after he pays off the marital debts.
42.

Based upon the courts' memorandum decision dated January 28, 1999, a

portion of the alimony awarded to the Petitioner should be non-terminable, even if
Petitioner remarries or cohabits, as follows:
a.

If Petitioner remarries or cohabits for the first time, before five years
from the date the Order regarding Property and Support Issues
Pursuant to Divorce is signed, the Petitioner's alimony should
immediately be lowered from the amount of alimony provided in
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paragraph 36 above to one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00)
a month. After five years from the date such Order is signed,
Petitioner's alimony should be raised to $2,000.00 per month,
b.

If Petitioner remarries or cohabits for the first time after five years
from the date the Order regarding Property and Support Issues
Pursuant to Divorce is signed, the Petitioner's alimony should be
lowered from the amount of alimony provided above in paragraph 41
above to the amount of $2,000.00 per month.

43.

Non terminable alimony is appropriate under the facts of this case because:
a.

Although the Petitioner was pursuing a college degree at the time of
the parties' marriage, she set aside her personal and educational
pursuits in order to raise five children, to be at home with them, to
maintain the household and to enable and assist Respondent in
obtaining his professional degree as well as develop his professional
skills.

b.

The Petitioner devoted all of her attention to raising the family and
supporting the Respondent during her twenty three years of marriage
to the Respondent.
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c.

Both parties had approximately equal earning capacity, education
and experience going into the marriage. During the marriage,
Petitioner was not able to advance her earning abilities because of
her support of the family and of Respondent's professional education
and business.

d.

Respondent was able to obtain a dental degree, a graduate degree in
dentistry, acquire seventeen (17) years of dental experience and
establish his own private practice, giving him the earning ability of
$13,500.00 a month, all with the support of the Petitioner.

e.

Both parties were equal contributors in advancing Respondent's
educational training.

f.

Petitioner assisted in the dental practice when needed.

g.

Petitioner has minimal earning capacity and no marketable skills. It
is not likely given her age of forty three (43) years that Petitioner
will be able to ever attain the skills or earning capacity to support
herself at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.

h.

Petitioner contributed $125,000.00 of her inheritance into the
marriage.
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i.

The parties spent all of the money that Respondent earned. The
parties are left with virtually no assets to be divided among them at
the end of the marriage,

j.

The parties have no retirement benefits or savings other than an IRA.

k.

Petitioner is entitled to a non-terminable award of alimony because
of her contribution to Respondent's increased earning capacity
during the marriage.

1.

The only way to provide the Petitioner a compensating adjustment
for her contribution to the greatly enhanced earning capacity of the
Respondent is to award her non-terminable alimony,

m.

Non-terminable alimony will be necessary to maintain Petitioner at a
standard of living similar to that which existed during the marriage,

n.

This award of alimony is not an award of any interest in the
professional degree of Respondent. Respondent's income from his
practice may change without affecting the amount of alimony he
pays to the Petitioner.

o.

Respondent has the ability to pay non terminable alimony which is
less than the court ordered alimony in paragraphs 36 and 41 above.
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44.

The alimony provided in paragraphs 36, 41 and 42 should continue until

April 30, 2021, this being the length of the marriage of the parlies from the date of
divorce. Non-terminable alimony will terminate on the death of either party.
Tax Exemptions
45.

The Respondent should be permitted to claim the children as tax

exemptions.
Attorneys Fees
46.

Petitioner should be awarded her attorney's fees, expert witness fees and

costs requested at trial.
47.

Respondent has the ability to pay Petitioner's fees ordered in this paragraph

as part of the judgment awarded to Petitioner below.
48.

Petitioner does not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees.

49.

Respondent has the ability to pay the attorney's fees requested by Petitioner

at trial.
50.

However, Respondent does not have the ability to pay Petitioner's

attorney's fees and costs incurred at trial over the amount estimated in Petitioner's
Attorney's Fee Affidavit as follows: attorney's fees of $1,100.00 and costs of $392.00.
Respondent does not have the ability to pay attorney's fees and costs incurred by
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Petitioner after trial for the preparation of post trial memoranda on non-terminable
alimony and the Findings of Fact among other post trial work in the amount of
$15,400.00.
51.

The court finds that one hundred and twenty dollars ($120.00) per hour

charged for Mr. Christensen's work is reasonable.
52.

Mr. Christensen's time spent in this case through trial was necessary and

reasonable in order to adequately represent Petitioner.
53.

The amount of attorney's fees requested at trial are reasonable and

necessary as follows:
a.

Petitioner's attorney's fees requested at trial were twelve thousand

seven hundred dollars ($12,700.00); and in addition
b.

Petitioner's expert witness fees are one thousand five hundred

dollars ($1,500.00) for the dental practice appraiser,
iser,•six hundred

_,fifty

fiwdulldis

($562.50) for trial preparation and testimony by Petitioner's accountant and three
hundred dollars ($300.00) for J. F. Pingree the accountant who consulted with
Petitioner's attorney in preparing this case for trial; and in addition
c.

Petitioner's costs are five hundred ninety three dollars and twelve
cents ($593.12) for deposition transcripts, Exhibits and court fees.
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Visitation
54.

The children should be permitted to travel to their father's home for

visitation by bus as long as such travel is made without causing the children to have to
transfer buses.
55.

Respondent may supply the court with alternative travel proposals.

56.

Respondent should pay for all visitation travel expenses.

57.

Respondent is the only party able to pay for visitation travel expenses.
Judgment

58.

The requested offsets to Petitioner's judgment against Respondent should

be allowed as follows:
a.

All of Respondent's attorneys fees of two thousand five hundred and

fifty dollars ($2,550.00) for the May 18, 1998 hearing should be paid by
Petitioner.
i.

The Commissioner made a specific finding that attorneys fees

for the May 12, 1998 hearing were Petitioner's responsibility,
ii.

It would be reasonable for Petitioner to pay Respondent's fees

for the May 18, 1998 hearing in light of the circumstances.
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b.

Petitioner's share of the medical expenses for the children incurred

prior to October 29, 1998 in the amount of one thousand nine dollars and
five cents ($1009.05).
c.

The Petitioner's agreed share of the appraisal paid by Respondent in

the amount of two hundred dollars ($200.00).
d.

Respondent's one thousand dollar ($1,000.00) payment in

December, 1997 towards the judgment against him.
59.

After the above adjustments, the prior judgment of the Petitioner should be

the original amount of eleven thousand eight hundred eighty two dollars and twenty six
cents ($11,882.26) minus the above credits of four thousand seven hundred fifty nine
dollars and five cents ($4,759.05) equaling a subtotal of seven thousand one hundred
twenty three dollars and twenty one cents ($7,123.21).
60.

The original judgment against the Respondent should be increased by the

following:
a.

If Petitioner is able to retain the marital residence in Ogden Utah,
Respondent should pay the payments he was ordered to pay under
the temporary order on the Ogden home mortgage for August, 1998
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and September, 1998 in the total amount of three thousand four
hundred ninety dollars and eighty two cents ($3,490.82);
b.

If Petitioner is able to keep the martial residence in Ogden, Utah,
Respondent should pay the late charges each month on the mortgage
on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah for his failure to keep the
mortgage current from June 1, 1997 through October 31, 1998 as
ordered in the temporary order in the total amount of two thousand
seventy one dollars and sixty two cents ($2,071.62);

c.

The Petitioner's share of the equity in the Montana property, which
is eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00);

d.

The Petitioner's attorney's fees of twelve thousand seven hundred
dollars ($12,700.00);

e.

The Petitioner's costs of five hundred ninety three dollars and twelve
cents ($593.12);

f.

The Petitioner's expert witness fees of two thousand^ixty two
dollars and fifty cents ($2,362.50); and

g.

The Petitioner's share of the dental equipment in the amount of
twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00).
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h.

If Petitioner is able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah,
one-half of the parties* equity in the marital residence in Ogden,
Utah existing at the time her ownership in that home is confirmed.
This confirmation will be made by the resolution and dismissal of
pending or threatened foreclosure proceedings against that residence.
The equity will be the difference between the appraised value of
$268,000.00 as found in paragraph 5 above and the total amount
owed on the home, including but not limited to interest, taxes,
principal on the mortgage and fees, including but not limited to
attorney's fees, penalties and court costs.

61.

Petitioner's total judgment after adding all enhancements is fifty six

thousand three hundred forty one dollars and twenty seven cents ($56,341.27) minus onehalf of the marital residence on Ogden, Utah as calculated in paragraph 60h above. If
Petitioner is not able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, Petitioner's total
judgment is fifty thousand seven himdred seventy eight dollars and eighty three cents
($50,778.83).
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62.

The property taxes for the marital residence in Ogden, Utah are considered

above in Paragraph 20 and are to be treated separately from and in addition to the
judgment described in Paragraphs 58 through 61 above.
63.

The total judgment in favor of the Petitioner as well as the property taxes

for the marital residence in Ogden, Utah shall constitute a lien against Respondent's
dental practice. If Respondent were to sell the dental practice before the judgment in
favor of Petitioner is paid, the amount due to Petitioner will be paid out of the sale.
Petitioner is granted a security interest in the dental equipment currently held by
Respondent and Respondent shall immediately sign all documentation necessary to
perfect Petitioner's security interest in the dental equipment.
64.

Respondent will pay the judgment to Petitioner described in Paragraphs 58

through 61 above in monthly installments as he is able as follows:
a.

In no event shall Respondent pay less than four thousand two
hundred and twenty dollars ($4,220.00) a month for the first five
years and five thousand two hundred twenty thousand dollars
($5,220.00) a month thereafter to Petitioner until all of the above
judgment plus ongoing support due to her is paid in full.
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b.

When the oldest minor child is emancipated, the parties will refigure
the appropriate amount of child support under Paragraph 30 above.
However, Respondent will continue to pay Petitioner in the same
amount he would pay for three minor children. The difference
between the adjusted child support and the amount actually paid will
be considered a payment toward the judgment Respondent owes to
Petitioner under the Divorce Decree.

c.

When child support is no longer due, Respondent's payment to
Petitioner will continue in the same amount as support for three
children until he has paid the entire judgment in full. This entire
child support amount will be considered a payment towards the
Petitioner's judgment against Respondent.

d.

If alimony decreases, Respondent shall continue to pay the full
amount of alimony ordered by this Court as a payment on the
judgment until all of the judgment ordered against Respondent is
paid in foil. All amounts paid by Respondent to Petitioner shall
accrue interest at the rate provided for by Utah Code Annotated §151-1 for post judgment interest from the date of entry of the Decree
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andfromthe date of any prior judgments*. Petitioner is also entitled
to interest on past due support as provided by Utah law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The parties were previously granted a Decree of Divorce in an Order of
Bifurcation.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(8) and Johnson v. Johnson. 855 P.2 250
(1993), this court has the discretion to award non-terminable alimony based on the
interests of justice and pursuant to the court's equitable powers.
All issues between the parties will be ordered in accordance with the Findings
above.
^

DATED this _ T l _ day of April 1999.

Approved as to Form

AArffiYi' • L / I V ^ < M ^ I
Dean Andreasen
Attorney for Respondent

*/»»**
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing FINDING OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW was mailed, postage prepaid, on the

day of March,

1999 to:
Dean C. Andreasen
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON

Attorneys for Respondent
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Steve S. Christensen (6156)
Attorney for Petitioner
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004

Telephone: (801) 322-0591
Facsimile: (801) 322-0592
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHERISE ROUNDY,

" "' " "ir

DIVORCE DECREE
Petitioner,

vs.

Civil No. 974900793 DA
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

V.CRAIG BARNEY,

Respondent.
Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce was heard before the court in trial on October
27, 1998 and October 29, 1998, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, District Judge
presiding. Petitioner was present and represented by her counsel, Steve S. Christensen;
Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Dean Andreasen.
The court having reviewed all of the exhibits admitted by both Petitioner and
Respondent, having reviewed the law applicable to this matter, having heard argument
from both counsel, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, now enters its:

211
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PACE

DECREE OF DIVORCE

The Stipulation of the parties is approved and the parities are ordered to comply
with such stipulation as follows:
1.

The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the minor children.

Petitioner will have the primary physical custody, care and control of the minor children,
subject to reasonable rights of visitation of the Respondent described as follows:
a.

Petitioner will always have the children during the first half of the
Christmas vacation including Christmas day. The Respondent will
have the second half of the Christmas vacation including New Years
Day. This way the children will not have to travel on Christmas
Day.

b.

Petitioner will always have the children during the Easter Holiday
and during the Utah Spring Break.

c.

The Respondent will have the children during the UEA break that
they have from school in the fall each year. He will also have the
children for Labor day and Memorial Day.

d.

Petitioner will always have the children for the 24th of July, as they
do not celebrate this in Montana.

Divorce Decree
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e.

Respondent will always have the children during the week of the 4th
of July. He has the option to use some of his summer vacation
during that time. He has a total of four weeks he can spend with the
children during the summer. Basketball camps in Montana will be
taken into consideration as these are important to the children.

f.

Respondent will have the children for Thanksgiving during the ODD
years.

g.

Petitioner will have the children for Thanksgiving during the EVEN
years.

h.

The parties will try to cooperate with one another in the summer
months and try to get the children to participate in extended family
reunions whenever possible. Trading July 4th or July 24th to allow
for family reunions will be acceptable. If a family reunion conflict
exists in the summer, the parties will alternate taking the children:
Petitioner will have the children during the 1st conflict time and
Respondent will have the next, etc.

i.

Respondent has the option of scheduling his visitation on 3-day
weekends if it works into his schedule, so he will be able to see the
children longer on his trips to Utah. Petitioner has second option on
Divorce Decree
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3-day weekends (except Labor Day and Memorial Day, which
Respondent already has.) If Cherise desires to have the children on
one of these minor holiday weekends, for a special event, then
Respondent will try to arrange a different time to see the children
that month. Petitioner will let Respondent know of any such
problems as soon as possible. Respondent will try to be as flexible
with these minor holiday changes as his work schedule permits.
j.

On months that do not have minor holidays, Petitioner will permit
the children to miss one day of school on a Monday to visit with
Respondent, provided he calls the school and arranges it with them.
Respondent must also have the children bring their schoolwork with
them so they can return to school on Tuesday and not be behind.

k.

Respondent will provide a proposed summer schedule by the prior
April 15 which will give Petitioner time to arrange any desired
changes. Petitioner will have until April 30 to reply to the summer
schedule. The parties will submit any dispute they cannot resolve
regarding visitation to mediation with the parties sharing the costs
thereof initially. The ultimate cost of mediation may be allocated
differently by the court.
Divorce Decree
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1.

Annie will arrange her own exceptions to this schedule with
Respondent. The other children will also have the right to work
things out with Respondent if there are conflicting school activities.

m.

Respondent will try to give Petitioner visitation schedules at least six
months but not more than one year in advance.

n.

Petitioner will always have two weeks to agree to or to suggest
changes to any visitation schedule Respondent sends her. This two
week time period will beginfromthe day Petitioner first receives the
visitation schedule by certified mail. If Petitioner does not pick up
the certified mail, it will be presumed that she received it five days
after Respondent's mailing is post marked.

o.

Family emergencies, Weddings, Funerals, etc. will take precedence
over the visitation schedule. Respondent and Petitioner will work
together to allow each other as much notice as possible for these
things. Respondent will make all changes in the visitation schedule
in writing 45 days in advance. Petitioner will have two weeks to
reply to suggested changes.
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p.

The parties shall implement, as applicable, the advisory guidelines
set forth in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-33, a photocopy of which is
attached as Exhibit 'B' to the Findings of Fact.

2.

Each party is awarded the personal property presently in his/her possession,

except that the Respondent will be awarded the hot tub, together with the electrical box,
stairs and accessories for the hot tub, installed at the Ogden property.
3.

The parties' daughter, Angelina Cherise Barney, age 17, is driving one of

the parties' vehicles. The parries will give title to such vehicle to their daughter,
Angelina, within thirty days of the signing of this order.
4.

The Respondent is ordered to provide a health msurance program for the

minor children of the parties covering hospital, doctor, medical expenses incurred by the
children. The cost of this insurance will be evenly divided between the parties. Further,
the parties is ordered to each pay one-half of all out-of-pocket reasonable and necessary
medical expenses paid to or for a provider other than Respondent, not covered by said
insurance.
5.

Each party is awarded the vehicle in his/her possession.

6.

The base child support shall not be reduced by 50% for time periods during

which extended visitation occurs for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days even though
the statue allows for this reduction.
Divorce Decree
Page 6

7.

A mutual restraining order shall be entered enjoining the parties from

harassing, abusing or annoying the other party.
LIFE INSURANCE

8.

Respondent is ordered to maintain the two hundred fifty thousand dollar

($250,000.00) life insurance policy on his life now in effect for the benefit of the
Petitioner and the minor children of the parties, naming the Petitioner as the beneficiary.
After child support terminates, Respondent is ordered to maintain life insurance for the
benefit of Petitioner naming Petitioner as the sole beneficiary of said insurance policy in
the amount of one hundred twenty five thousand dollars ($125,000.00) during the period
of time Respondent owes Petitioner alimony.
DENTAL PRACTICE

9.

Respondent is awarded his dental practice and the assets and property

associated therewith subject to the lien of Petitioner pursuant to paragraph 45 below.
10.

One-half of the equity of the dental practice is awarded to Petitioner in the

amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00).
REAL PROPERTY

11.

The Montana duplex is awarded to Respondent.

12.

One-half of the equity of the Montana duplex is awarded to Petitioner in the

amount of eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00).
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13.

The marital residence in Ogden, Utah will be awarded to Petitioner in the

event that she may be able to save the home from foreclosure. If any liens for marital
debts are attached to the home, Respondent is ordered to hold Petitioner harmless from
such liens on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah. If Petitioner pays any marital debts
secured by the marital residence, Respondent is ordered to indemnify Petitioner.
IRA
14.

The IRA of the parties in the amount of three thousand six hundred dollars

($3,600.00) held at Piper Jaffrey under account #522-12670-220 is marital property.
Respondent is ordered to pay one half of said IRA account to Petitioner in the cash
amount of approximately $1,800.00.
DEBT DIVISION

15.

Respondent is ordered to pay all of the parties' past due Internal Revenue

Service debt for 1995 in the amount of three thousand five hundred fourteen dollars
($3,514.00) and for 1996 in the amount of sixty two thousand three hundred twelve
dollars ($62,312.00), to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner
for any payment she makes thereon. Each party is responsible for any tax debt on
income reported on such separate returns filed by him or her for the years 1997 and
thereafter.
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16.

Respondent is ordered to pay all of the parties' past due state tax debts for

the year 1996 in the amount of nine thousand six hundred fifty seven dollars ($9,657.00),
to hold Petitioner harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she
makes thereon. Each party is responsible for any tax debt on income reported on such
separate returns filed by him or her for the years 1997 and thereafter.
17.

If Petitioner is able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah,

Respondent is ordered to pay current all real property taxes for all years prior to and
including 1998, in the amount of eighty eight hundred dollars ($8,800.00) plus interest
after October 31, 1998, in order to enable Petitioner to refinance such property, consistent
with the court's orderfromthe January 11, 1999 hearing in this case. If Petitioner is not
able to retain the marital residence in Ogden, Utah, Respondent is ordered to hold
Petitioner harmless against collection of any delinquent real property taxes through 1998
plus interest on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah and is ordered to indemnify
Petitioner for any payments she makes towards such taxes and interest.
18.

Respondent is ordered to pay all marital debt incurred prior to April 1997

not specifically addressed under paragraphs 14 through 16 above, to hold Petitioner
harmless therefrom and to indemnify Petitioner for any payment she makes thereon.
19.

Respondent is ordered to pay debts separately incurred by him after March,

1997 in addition to the other debts assigned to him in this Decree.
Divorce Decree
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20.

Respondent is ordered to make payments of three thousand dollars

($3,000.00) per month to the IRS and the State of Montana in order to resolve unpaid
marital obligations.
21.

Except as otherwise ordered in this Decree, Petitioner is ordered to pay all

debts separately incurred by her since her bankruptcy in 1998.
22.

The parties will bear his or her own debt for the vehicle each is driving.

23.

The parties are ordered to pay the mortgages on the real property awarded

to him or her except as set out in other paragraphs in this decree.
24.

The order that Respondent pay marital debt on behalf of the Petitioner is

made by way of further support and maintenance for the Petitioner and is not to be
considered a property settlement.
CHILD SUPPORT

25.

Respondent is ordered to pay child support for the parties three minor

children: Angelina Cherise, 12/21/82; Sandin Craig, 9/18/85; and Fabione Sadie
Marcella, 12/19/87.
26.

Respondent is ordered to pay child support of $2,220.00 a month, initially,

calculated as follows:
a.

Using a sole custody worksheet, if Petitioner has a gross monthly income of
$893.00 and Respondent has the highest gross monthly income on the table
Divorce Decree
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of $10,000.00, child support would be $1,660.00 or approximately 16.6
percent of the highest gross monthly income on the child support table for
Respondent. Extrapolating this percentage to Respondent's actual gross
monthly income of $13,500.00 results in child support of approximately
$2,220.00 per month ($13,500.00 x 16.6 percent). Child support shall be
recomputed using the same methodology when there is a change in
circumstances under Utah law.
b.

Child support will continue for a child until the child attains the age
of 18 years or graduates from high school with his or her regular
class, whichever is later.

27.

Respondent is ordered to pay his child support obligation in no more than

two equal installments no later than the 5th and 20th days of the month.
28.

Respondent is ordered to pay any monthly transaction fee for income

withholding of his child support obligation by Office of Recovery Services.
ALIMONY

29.

Respondent is ordered to pay alimony of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00)

per month for five years.
30.

Respondent is ordered to pay income taxes for state, federal and self

employment on his entire income of thirteen thousand five hundred dollars ($13,500.00) a
Divorce Decree
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month, without any deduction for alimony, in addition to his obligations for marital debts
and child support ordered above.
31.

After five yearsfromthe date of the entry of the Divorce Decree,

Respondent is ordered to increase his alimony payments to a total alimony payment of
three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) per month.
32.

Based upon the courts' memorandum decision dated January 28, 1999, a

portion of the alimony awarded to the Petitioner will not terminate if Petitioner remarries
or cohabits. In the event of marriage or cohabitation by Petitioner, Respondent is ordered
to pay alimony as follows:
a.

If Petitioner remarries or cohabits for the first time, before five years
from the date the Divorce Decree is entered, the Petitioner's alimony
will immediately be lowered from the amount of alimony provided
in paragraph 29 above to one thousand five hundred dollars
($1,500.00) a month. After five years from the date such Decree is
entered, Petitioner's alimony will be raised to $2,000.00 per month.

b.

If Petitioner remarries or cohabits for the first time after five years
from the date the Divorce Decree is entered, the Petitioner's alimony
will be lowered from the amount of alimony provided above in
paragraph 31 above to the amount of $2,000.00 per month.
Divorce Decree
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33.

The alimony provided in paragraphs 29, 31 and 32 will continue until

April 30, 2021, this being the length of the marriage of the parties from the date of
divorce. Regular and non-terminable alimony will terminate on the death of either party.
TAX EXEMPTIONS

34.

The Respondent will be awarded therightto claim the children as tax

exemptions each year so long as Respondent is current on all obligations to Petitioner and
his children under this Divorce Decree.
ATTORNEY'S FEES

35.

Petitioner is awarded her attorney's fees, expert witness fees and costs

requested at trial as follows:
a.

Petitioner's attorney's fees requested at trial were twelve thousand
seven hundred dollars ($12,700.00); and in addition

b.

Petitioner's expert witness fees are one thousand five hundred
dollars ($1,500.00) for the dental practice appraiser, five hundred
sixty two dollars and fifty cents ($562.50) for trial preparation and
testimony by Petitioner's accountant and three hundred dollars
($300.00) for J. F. Pingree the accountant who consulted with
Petitioner's attorney in preparing this case for trial; and in addition
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c.

Petitioner's costs are five hundred ninety three dollars and twelve
cents ($593.12) for deposition transcripts, Exhibits and court fees.

36.

Petitioner's Motion for Additional Attorney's Fees at Trial for fees and

costs of $1,492.00 included in her attorney fee affidavit which was submitted prior to the
last day of trial is denied. Attorney's Fees for post trial matters is denied in the amount
of $14,400.00, including her fees for preparation of the briefs, which were requested by
the court on the issue of non-terminable alimony, for her preparation of the Findings and
Decree and for the hearing on the Findings.
VISITATION

37.

The children may travel to their father's home for visitation by bus as long

as such travel is made without causing the children to have to transfer buses.
38.

Respondent may supply the court with alternative travel proposals.

39.

Respondent is ordered to pay for all visitation travel expenses.
JUDGMENT

40.

Respondent will be allowed the requested offsets for past due alimony and

attorney's fees to Petitioner's judgment against Respondent in the prior amount of eleven
thousand eight hundred eighty two dollars and twenty six cents ($11,882.26) as follows:
a.

All of Respondent's attorneys fees of two thousand five hundred and
fifty dollars ($2,550.00) for the May 18, 1998 hearing.
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b.

Petitioner's share of the medical expenses for the children incurred
prior to October 29, 1998 in the amount of one thousand nine dollars
and five cents ($1009.05).

c.

The Petitioner's agreed share of the appraisal paid by Respondent in
the amount of two hundred dollars ($200.00).

d.

Respondent's one thousand dollar ($1,000.00) payment in
December, 1997 towards the judgment against him.

e.

If Petitioner is able to keep the marital residence in Ogden, Utah,
one-half of the equity in the marital residence in Ogden, Utah
existing at the time her ownership in that home is confirmed. This
confirmation will be made by the resolution and dismissal of
pending or threatened foreclosure proceedings against that residence.
The equity will be difference between the appraised value of
$268,000.00 as found in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact and the
total amount owed on the home, including, but not limited to
interest, taxes, principal on the mortgage and fees, including but not
limited to attorney's fees, penalties and court costs.

41.

The above credits are four thousand seven hundred fifty nine dollars and

five cents ($4,759.05) plus Respondent's share of the equity of the marriage residence in
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Ogden, Utah, referred to above in paragraph 40e, if applicable. After the adjustment, the
prior amoimt of the Petitioner's judgment of will be adjusted from eleven thousand eight
hundred eighty two dollars and twenty six cents ($11,882.26) to a new amoimt of seven
thousand one hundred twenty three dollars and twenty one cents ($7,123.21) minus the
Respondent's share of the equity of the marriage residence in Ogden, Utah, referred to
above in paragraph 40e, if applicable.
42.

In addition to adjusted judgment against the Respondent, Respondent is

ordered to pay and Petitioner is awarded an additional judgment for the following:
a.

If Petitioner is able to retain the marital residence in Ogden Utah,
Respondent will pay the payments he was ordered to pay under the
temporary order on the Ogden home mortgage for August, 1998 and
September, 1998 in the total amount of three thousand four hundred
ninety dollars and eighty two cents ($3,490.82);

b.

If Petitioner is able to retain the martial residence in Ogden, Utah,
Respondent shall pay the late charges each month on the mortgage
on the marital residence in Ogden, Utah for his failure to keep the
mortgage current from June 1, 1997 through October 31, 1998 as
ordered in the temporary order in the total amount of two thousand
seventy one dollars and sixty two cents ($2,071.62);
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c.

The Petitioner's share of the equity in the Montana property, which
is eight thousand dollars ($8,000.00);

d.

The Petitioner's attorney's fees of twelve thousand seven hundred
dollars ($12,700.00);

e.

The Petitioner's costs for trial of five hundred ninety three dollars
and twelve cents ($593.12);

f.

The Petitioner's expert witness fees of two thousand three hundred
sixty two dollars and fifty cents ($2,362.50); and

g.

The Petitioner's share of the value of the dental practice in the
amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00).

43.

Petitioner is awarded a total judgment after adding all enhancements of fifty

six thousand three hundred forty one dollars and twenty seven cents ($56,341.27) minus
Respondent's share if any as defined above in paragraph 38e of the equity in the marital
residence in Ogden, Utah.
44.

The property taxes for the marital residence in Ogden, Utah are considered

above in Paragraph 17 and are to be treated separately from and in addition to the
judgment described in Paragraphs 40 through 43 above.
45.

The total judgment in favor of the Petitioner as well as the property taxes

for the marital residence in Ogden, Utah shall constitute a lien against Respondent's
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dental practice. If Respondent sells the dental practice or any part thereof before the
judgment in favor of Petitioner is paid, the amount due to Petitioner is ordered to be paid
out of the sale. Petitioner is granted a security interest in the dental equipment currently
held by Respondent and Respondent is ordered to immediately sign all documentation
necessary to perfect Petitioner's security interest in the dental equipment.
46.

Respondent is ordered to pay the judgment to Petitioner described in

Paragraphs 40 through 43 above in monthly installments as he is able and at least in the
following amounts:
a.

When the oldest minor child is emancipated, the parties are ordered
to refigure the appropriate amount of child support under Paragraph
26 above. However, Respondent is ordered to continue to pay
Petitioner in the same amount he would pay for three minor children.
The difference between the adjusted child support and the amount
actually paid will be considered a payment toward the judgment
Respondent owes to Petitioner under the Divorce Decree.

b.

When child support is no longer due, Respondent is ordered to make
payments to Petitioner in the same amount as support for three
children until he has paid the entire judgment in full. This entire
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child support amount will be considered a payment towards the
Petitioner's judgment against Respondent.
c.

If Petitioner remarries or cohabits, resulting in decreased alimony,
Respondent is ordered to continue to pay the same amount he was
ordered to pay for alimony as though the cohabitation or remarriage
did not occur. However, the difference between the amount paid and
the alimony ordered by the court under this Decree will be
considered a payment towards the Petitioner's judgment against
Respondent.

d.

In no event shall Respondent pay less than four thousand two
hundred and twenty dollars ($4,220.00) a month to Petitioner in
support and judgment payments for the first five years after the
signing of the Decree and five thousand two hundred twenty dollars
($5,220.00) a month to Petitioner in support and judgment payments
thereafter until all of the above judgment plus ongoing support due
to her is paid in full.

e.

All amounts paid by Respondent to Petitioner shall accrue interest at
the rate provided for by Utah Code Annotated §15-1-1 for post
judgment interest from the date of entry of the Decree andfromthe
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date of any prior judgments. Petitioner is also entitled to interest on
past due support as provided by Utah law.
47.

The parties shall execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer

the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto.
DATED this

U

day of A^j4, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

Judge7 Stant
District Co
Approved as to form

KUUA r, /jOyvfai
Dean Andreasen
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing DIVORCE DECREE was mailed
first class, postage prepaid on the

^u

day of April 1999 to:

Dean Andreasen
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON

Attorneys for Respondent
201 South Main Street, #1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

^ fi 0 J ms

CHERISE ROUNDY,
MEMORANDUM DECISION^
Petitioner,

± s

vs.

OD
•

V. CRAIG BARNEY,

o
C/>

Case No. 97190O333 g
Respondent.

j

•s? 2
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Following a trial on October 29, 1998, the court took under
advisement whether nonterminable alimony was appropriate in the
instant circumstances. Both sides have briefed the issue.
The state legislature clearly provided that alimony could
continue beyond the remarriage of the receiving spouse, if the
divorce decree so specifically provides. Utah Code Annotated,

§

30-3-5(8). The availability of nonterminable alimony has likewise
been recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals. See Johnson
Johnson,

v.

855 P.2d 250 (1993). In the interests of justice and

pursuant to the court's equitable powers under § 30-3-5, U.C.A.,
the court finds that the instant case justifies the award of
nonterminable alimony. See Johnson

at 252.

The decision to award permanent alimony is based on many
relevant factors. The court makes the following findings:
Petitioner is in need of alimony. Respondent has the ability to
pay alimony. Respondent's earning capacity was greatly enhanced

704
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through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage.
Petitioner supported respondent during dental school. Petitioner,
likewise, supported respondent during the specialized training
after dental school. Petitioner and respondent worked jointly to
establish the dental practice. Petitioner dedicated her
inheritance of $125,000.00 to the marriage, which amount has been
entirely consumed. There are only minimal marital assets to be
divided. Petitioner is in a precarious financial position.
Petitioner has a minimal earning capacity. Petitioner has no
marketable skills. Petitioner did not pursue additional training
or work experience in order to support respondent and to raise
their children. The marriage had a duration of twenty-three
years. If petitioner were to remarry, she will have essentially
zero financial security to reflect her twenty-three years of
dedication to respondent and to their family, constituting a
restraint on the freedom of petitioner to remarry. Petitioner and
respondent were accustomed to a high standard of living. Although
the court considers respondent's ability to provide support (as
per § 30-3-5(7), U.C.A.), the court specifically does not
consider the value in respondent's professional degree and the
good will in his dental practice.
Accordingly, the court finds that alimony, a portion of
which will be nonterminable, is justified. Respondent will pay
alimony in the amount of $2,000.00 per month. After five years,
the alimony will increase to $3,000.00 (based on respondent's
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increased ability to pay once tax responsibilities are
satisfied). If petitioner remarries, the alimony will be
decreased to $1,500,00, if the five years have not yet passed
from the entry of judgment, and to $2,000.00, if and when five
years have passed. The later amount is nonterminable. The court
will have continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony based on a
substantial material change in circumstances not freseeable at
this time.
The ruling of the court on October 29, 1998 is hereby
amended, as necessary, by this decision. Mr. Christensen will
please prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this

day of January, 1999.

ylor, Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

i st
I hereby certify that on the I

r- .

Feb

-

day of *wH*eHry, 1999, I

sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to counsel
as follows:
Steve S. Christensen
HENROID NIELSEN & CHRISTENSEN
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1160
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004
Dean C. Andreason
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
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and then decide if the children need that expense. 1

2

believe the children in this case do need that expense.

3

The parties have created those needs including housing,

4

food, and the other expenses that they have acquired a life

5

style for and that amount will be a short term amount of

6

less than seven years.

7

And, your Honor, I would indicate to the Court,

8

by Ms. Roundy having real property, she is able to take

9

that as a tax deduction which gives her $600 a month in

10

savings.

11

housing, her taxes would go up by that amount by not having

12

that housing and I think that does offset any concern of

13

the reasonableness of the housing.

14

is not adequate housing, it's housing at the level that

15

these parties are used to living.

16

attention.

17

So whatever the concern about having expensive

THE COURT:

It's not, the standard

Thank you for your

We'll be in recess for about five

18 I minutes.
19

(Whereupon a recess was taken.)

20

THE COURT:

I guess if it was easy, you wouldn't

21

be here, would you?

The problem is that I didn't bring my

22

baby cutting sword.

What is it that W.C. Fields said, "All

23 I things considered, I'd rather be in Philadelphia".

I'm

24

going to go through this and it's going to take us a little

25

time because 1 do have some questions as we go along.
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1

To make an observation to begin with.

1 am

2

finding and I'm sure this is not going to be any great

3

shock to anyone, that the parties and their standard of

4

living was an extremely extravagant one.

5

recall ever seeing a case where people would go through the

6

amount of money that you folks have gone through and not

7

have anymore to show for it than what you have to show for

8

it.

I mean it's a shame, it's a, I don't know how you did

9

it.

I'm not sure that you know.

In fact, I don't

But to have gone through

10

the kind of gross, I mean here you are grossing in excess

11

of $400,000 a year and whether we find your overhead was

12

60% or 50% that's still means, you know, somehow you're

13

burning up $160 to $180,000 and not even paying taxes and

14

not buying anything of substance.

15

homes.

16

any substantial equity in it, in fact, the default debts

17

probably far exceed any equity that you have in the house.

I mean you bought two

You bought one here in Ogden, but you don't have

18 I And you have a little equity in the one up in Montana but
19

that's a shame, not to mention $125,000 that was the

20

inheritance and the Court, by the way, finds in fact that

21

that was commingled.

22

blown right along with all of the rest of the money that

23

was coming in.

24

don't think there's anyway we can really do justice.

25

Regardless of what I do, I don't think there is anyway that

It became a martial asset and was

I feel really bad about this because I
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1

1 can do justice just based upon the fact that you-folks

2

have blown an opportunity to invest.

3

millionaires.

You ought to be

You know, with the kind of money you were

4 J making, you ought to be millionaires.

Gees, how many

5 I people have an opportunity of getting $125,000 cash handed
6

to them?

And to blow it and not have anything to show for

7

it, that's, I don't understand.

8

Unfortunately, you are going to have to suffer by reason of

9

that.

10

I don't understand.

Now when we are considering both child support

11

and alimony, it's very difficult for me to determine what

12

kind of a standard of living that, obviously you were

13

living so extravagantly that there is no way that there's

14

going to be money that you are going to be able to maintain

15

anywhere near the kind of standard of living that either

16

one of you were living before.

17

not money there to do it with.

18 |

Just can't do it.

There's

Well, let's get started at the beginning of these

19

things and see if I can kind of deal with them with what

20

we've got.

The Court, of course, had previously granted

21 I the divorce so I'm not going to have to be concerned about
22

that.

We bifurcated that issue.

That the Court finds that

23

the stipulation of parties concerning the custody of the

24

children and the visitation schedule, I find that is

25

reasonable and order that that be incorporated into the
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1

findings of decree.

I'm going to encourage both of you, I

2

think both of you are going to go away feeling dissatisfied

3

and upset.

4

what they pay me my magnificent salary for.

Please, be upset at me, that's okay.

5 I don't take it out on your kids.

That's

But please

You know, they are the

6

real victims.

You two, I suppose, get what you deserve.

7

You know, you made the choices you made but please,

8

understand those kids have to feel good about both of you

9 J in order for them to feel good about themselves.

If you

10

want your kids to go through a real identity crisis, tear

11

down the other parent in front of them because that's the

12

quickest way in this world I can think of doing it.

13

know, you're going to have to make a decision which is most

14

important to you, your love of your children or your anger

15

and hate of each other.

16

kids then keep tearing each other down.

17

to end up with kids who are having problems.

18 I don't do that.
19

You

If you don't give a damn about the
That's a good way
So please

Please consider the love of your children.

The Court awards each party the personal property

20

presently in their possessions as was stipulated between

21

the parties with one exception.

22

tub.

23 I

I think that was the hot

The hot tub goes to Dr. Barney.
In finding that the $125,000 became marital

24

property and was flittered away, that the Court also finds

25

that, you know, normally the income tax that would have
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been a debt of the parties but somehow it only seems fair
to me that the doctor should pay that debt.

So, he has the

3 I tax debt.
4

The IRA, what I would prefer to say, you know,

5 I each one of them is entitled to half of it.

The concern I

6

have is that if they cash it out there is going to be an

7

additional tax liability and I think we want to avoid as

8

much of the taxes as we possibly can. And if there is some

9

way, is it in the Doctor's name at the present time?

10 I

MR. ANDREASEN:

It is.

But under the Internal

11

Revenue Code it can be transferred to her tax free.

12

she does with it from there, of course, is her decision.

13

THE COURT:

14 I

MS. ROUNDY: May I say something?

What

That would be to her decision.
I told my

15

lawyer not to mention the IRA because it's not our money.

16

It's my in-laws money and I don't want any of it.

17

their money.

18 |

It's

So, just leave it for them.

THE COURT:

All right.

No.

Divide it. Divide

19

it. And let's do it so that it is a tax free thing so that

20

she gets her share and then she can do with it what she

21

wants to do.

22

to his parents, she could do that.

And I suppose if she wanted to give it back

23

Okay.

The Court, of course, is going to award to

24

him the dental practice.

25

going to have to remind me.

I think that makes sense.

You're

There was a specific amount of
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equity in the property in Montana.
MR. ANDREASEN: $206 minus 190, so approximately
3 I $16,000.
4

THE COURT: $16,000?

Okay.

All right.

5 I award that property to him since it's up there.
6

We will
I wonder—

I'll come back to that.

7

The Court finds in accordance with my previous

8

ruling that the value of the practice would be $40,000. I

9

recognize that there is some problems with that.

I really

10

do have some heartburn over it.

So that everybody will

11

understand that I do have some sympathy for the fact that

12

the petitioner in this case had spent 23 years of her life

13 | helping to develop the practice, supporting him so that he
14

would be able to do the development the practice even to

15

the extent of the $125,000 that either went to expenses or

16

assisted in building up the practice.

17

only thing she would be entitled to is half the physical

And then to say the

18 | assets of the business, I really do have some problems with
19

that.

But, I think I'm bound by what the Supreme Court has

20

said and I, for a long time, have felt like, that the value

21

of his education ought to be a marital asset.

But, once

22 I again, the Supreme Court don't agree with me and I'm bound
23

by the law as it is, not as I would necessarily like it to

24 I be.

So the Court will divide that $20,000 to each.

Well,

25 J rather than saying to each at this point, I'm going to say
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1

the value of the asset is $40,000.

2

Now the Court would award to each party the

3

vehicles that they have in their possession subject to the

4

debts. And the van, as I understood, the daughter is now

5 I driving that.
6

Is that the 22 year old that's away from

home ?

7

DR. BARNEY:

8

THE COURT:

9
10
11

Oh, it was repossessed.

That's

right.
DR. BARNEY:

It's a 1990 Dodge Dynasty that she

is driving, yes.

12

THE COURT:

13

DR. BARNEY:

14

Your Honor, the van was repossessed.

she is driving.

Pardon me?
A 1990 Dodge Dynasty.

That's what

That's the other vehicle.

15

THE COURT:

16

DR. BARNEY:

17

THE COURT:

18

DR. BARNEY: A $1,400 car.

19

THE COURT:

No, there is not.
Free and clear.

Do you have any problem with her

20

keeping that?

21

own cars and pay for them and we'll let the daughter keep

22

the other car.

23

Okay.

Is there a debt on that?

Then we'll let each of you keep your

The Court will allow as offsets the things that

24 I have been stipulated to; the $1,000 payment, the appraisal,
25

the insurance premiums, medical costs for the kids.
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And on the attorney's fees on the contempt, I
think where the commissioner made that specific finding and
3 I recommendation and the Court, in view of all of the
4

circumstances, feels like that was probably an appropriate

5

recommendation so the Court will affirm that and allow that

6

also as an offset against the judgment which he had granted

7

to the petitioner on the back due support.

8

back due alimony, wasn't it?

9

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

10
11

THE COURT:

14

Yes.

All right.

The difficult issue and

that's the support and alimony.

12
13

I think it was

M S . ROUNDY: What does that leave on the judgment
then?
THE COURT:

Well, let's total the whole thing up

15

when we get to the end because there are going to be some

16

other things back and forth because we haven't dealt with

17 I the attorney's fees, your request for attorney's fees on
18 J the total hearing and in view of the cash situation of the
19 I parties I am going to award some attorney's fees and we'll
20

get to the amount in a little while but it would be my

21

intention to add that to the previous judgment along with

22

some other things that I think are appropriate there.

And

23 | while I'm thinking about that specific issue, the Court is
24 I granting the petitioner a lien against the dental practice

25

for the amounts of the judgment which I think will deal
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1

with the bankruptcy issue.

2

Let me ask a question just in the interest of

3

information.

4

the exhibits.

5

go with the $1,660 permanent support obligation.

6

Presumably that would be the three children and that would

7

be based upon, is $1,660 based upon the maximum figure on

8

the schedule or is there some extrapolation it's imputed

9

on?

10
11

And I suppose I could get this if I went to
The respondent is encouraging the Court to

MR. ANDREASEN: No, it's based upon $10,000 of
gross income from him, minimum wage for her.

12

THE COURT:

13

On the visitation and travel for visitation, that

14

is the responsibility of the respondent and buses are okay.

15

I see.

Okay.

Once again, thevdifficult part relates to the

16

evaluation of what would be an appropriate amount of child

17

support and alimony.

18

would probably not be an appropriate figure, the $1,660.

19

So, what I've done is extrapolate it. And I figured that

20

$1,660 support for $10,000 figures out at about 16%.

21

figuring his income times the 16%, I come up with a figure

22

of $2,220 child support, and once again that's just the

23

extrapolation.

24

child becomes of age.

25

figure the $10,000 and then figure 16% based upon the same

The Court believes that the maximum

In

We'll follow the same formula when the next
In other words we would go back and
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application for two children instead of three and then one
child so they can kind of have the formula.

The Court is

3 I basing that figure on a monthly income of $13,500 which is
4
5 I

based on a gross net of $162,000.
Now, I have to tell you that the Court was

6

somewhat impressed by one of the proposals of the

7

petitioner which related to decreases in some of the

8

expenses that have been forecast for previous years, some

9

decreases in travel expense and education expense and

10

automobile expense.

The Court did not factor in the

11

requested depreciation because I think there is an

12

offsetting cost of the purchase of new equipment on an

13

ongoing basis from the income that's available.

1 have not

14 I added those amounts to the $162,000, but what I have done
15

is assumed in some of the subsequent figures that he would

16

have more disposable income to pay amounts that I'm going

17

to order for him to pay.

So the basis for the $2,220 was

18 | $13,500 plus minimum wage imputed to petitioner.
19 I

In figuring alimony the Court is making this

20

specific finding that that the petitioner has a real need

21

for alimony to support her and the Court recognizes that

22

the doctor does not have the ability to support her to the

23

extent that they were living previously to their

24 I separation.
25

But nonetheless, that he has an obligation

based upon his earning capacity to provide some degree of
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security and to a degree that she would not be capable of
supporting herself.

So I'm finding that she has a need,

that she does not have the ability to provide that for
herself and that he does have some ability to provide
assistance for her.

In computing the alimony, once again I

start out with the base of 13.5 per month and I deduct from
the 13.5 the taxes that he damn well better pay on an
ongoing basis.
things.

In fact, that's one of the astonishing

I can't imagine anybody not paying their taxes. I

don't understand that.

So, I figure $4,855 is the tax

figure for both Federal and State taxes based upon, you
know, projected incomes.

So, I'm deducting $4,855, which

would be his tax liability which leaves an amount of
$8,645.

The Court recognizes that he is going to have to

have to be paying on the horrendous amount of back taxes
which will also include the taxes for calendar year 1998
that he hasn't been paying anything on now.

So what I'm

going to do is give him another deduction from the $8,645
to take into account the fact that he is going to have to
pay off the IRS.

I am, I am, well, I deducted $3,000 per

month for that purpose and I'm convinced that he is going
to have to pay at least $3,000 a month on that obligation
to the IRS.

That leaves an amount of $5,645 dollars and

what I'm in essence doing is dividing that between the
parties to kind of equalize their income.

So, I'm going to
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1

require him to pay to her the sum of $2,823 per month

2

alimony.

3

five years, which would be the amount of time that it's

4

going to take him to pay off the tax liability.

I'm going to require that figure for a period of

At the end

5 I of the five year period, I am ordering that that sum be
6

increased by the sum of $1,000 so that in five years he is

7

going to pay $3,823. And that that would be a permanent

8

alimony award.

9

MR. ANDREASEN:

10

figure, I'm sorry.

11

that computation?

12

Where did the child support come into
I must have missed that.

THE COURT:

13 J didn't.

Your Honor, I must have missed a

No, I didn't factor that in.

Well, back to the drawing board.

I

Okay, back to

14

the old drawing board.

We'll start out once again with the

15

base of $13,500.

16

$4,855, that leaves us $8,645, then we substract from that

17

the child support obligation of $2,220 and that leaves us,

18

if my mathematics are correct, with $6,425.

19

deduct from that the $3,000 that he's going to have to pay

20

on his ongoing tax obligation, that's going to leave a

21

balance of disposable income of about $3,425. My initial

22

feeling was that we should at that point divide the

23

disposable income equally. I don't think that is going to

24

work.

25

$2,000 alimony and encourage the doctor to make adjustments

We take off this tax obligation which is

Now, if we

So, what the Court is going to do is award her a
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to that figure taking into account the items that were
raised by the petitioner in reducing travel, education,
3 I automobile expense, that sort of thing.

And I feel like

4

under those circumstances that we'll be able to pretty well

5

equalize the income where he has an obligation of $2,220

6

child support and $2,000 alimony.

7

MS. ROUNDY:

Well, why don't you subtract it from

8

the $15,000 a month he's been making for the last two years

9

instead of $13,500?

10

THE COURT:

Well, let's see, where was I?

11

as I was saying after a five year period when the tax

12

responsibility will have been taken care of.

Then

The Court

13 I will order that that $2,000 increase to the sum of $3,000
14

and the $3,000 figure at that point would become permanent.

15

The Court, and I don't know what the exact figures are

16

going to be because I don't, you know, we have the

17

judgment, the previous judgment less the offsets.

And then

18 | we're going to have to include $8,000 which would be her
19

share of the Montana property, $20,000 for her share of the

20

practice, and the Court is finding that the request for

21

attorney's fees and costs is a reasonable one and that the

22

judgment will include those four figures.

23 J

On payment of the judgment, the Court is going to

24

order that as this will be an interest bearing judgment but

25

I don't think it would be appropriate at this point to make
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it executable.

I don't think we ought to execute on the

practice although I am ordering that she have a lien
against the practice for the amount of the judgment.
As child support is reduced by reason of children
becoming emancipated, either by achieving their 18th
birthday or graduating from high school with their regular
class whichever occurs last, that he start paying the
amount of child support reduction.

In other words, I want

her to still get the same amount of money but he'll be
paying that against the judgment.
MR. ANDREASEN:

Would you say that one more time,

Judge?
THE COURT:

In other words, let's assume where

child support of $2,220, let's say that the child support
reduces by $600 when the first child comes of age.

We will

continue to pay that $2,220 but the $600 will be applied
against the judgment.

And then the second child the same

thing, the third child the same thing until the judgment is
paid in full.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Your Honor, the ultimate

alimony was going to be $3,823.
THE COURT:

Yes, but I neglected to factor in the

fact that he was also paying out $2,220.

I had forgotten

to factor that in.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Right.

But that will drop off
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1

about that same time, two years later.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

4

I'm sorry?
The child support will

completely had dropped off two years after that by your

5 I adjustment.

This is no longer a factor.

The Court is

6

saying the ultimate long term alimony is only going to be

7

$3,000 in 2.3 years?

8

THE COURT:

9

That's right.

Have I overlooked

anything?

10

MR. ANDREASEN:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. ANDREASEN:

I'm sorry, your Honor.

Have I overlooked anything?
Again, I do have a number of

13 J points of clarification that 1 need to ask but I don't know
14

if you're finished or not.

15
16

THE COURT:

Oh, please do.

That's why I like to

rule from the bench so that we can talk about it.

17

MR. ANDREASEN:

Some standard things, let me make

18

sure that Dr. Barney will continue to pay or to maintain

19

the medical insurance and the parties will equally share

20

the cost.

21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

Medical insurance, equally share, yes

the statutory language on the medical.
MR. ANDREASEN:

Okay. The alimony will terminate

upon statutory events.
THE COURT:

That's right.
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MR. ANDREASEN:

1
2

going to do with that?

THE COURT:

3
4

Mar ital residence, what are we

Oh, yes , I forgot the residence.

It's awarded to her but I don't think she's going to be

5 1 able to maintain it. I feel really bad about that.
6

MS. ROUNDY: I don't want the house

n

MR. ANDREASEN:

i

On the practical 1 evel, your

8

Honor , I believe although we are not being far maybe with

9

Mr. Burgy, I think they can live there probably for a

10

period of time free.

11

him.

12

may allow her sufficient time to find other suitable

13

housing.

But the bankruptcy, of course, will tie it up.

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. ROUNDY.

16
17

I'm not sure that that is fair to

gave it all to him.
THE COURT:

That'd be nice.
You didn't give me a thing.

Okay.

He gets the tax deductions.

He is required to maintain life insurcince.

19

$100,000 is adequate.

21

You

(Inaudible).

18

20

That

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I don't think

I believe he has a policy of

$200 or $350 in effect.

22

MR. ANDREASEN: $250.

23

THE COURT: $250?

All right.

Let's have her be

24

the beneficiary of that at least until the child support

25

ends and then half of that probably.
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1
2

MR. ANDREASEN:
home, I'm sorry?

3

Our proposal?

THE COURT:

4

Well, it's awarded to her for —
(Over talking)

5

MR. ANDREASEN:

6

I have.

7

in particular.

Just a couple of other questions,

I believe under the case law, the Rhinehart case
There needs to be a specific finding of

8 J need beyond the table.
9

What was your decision on the

Are you making findings as to needs

for the children for purposes

10

THE COURT:

—

As a matter of fact, the children

11

have been maintained at an extremely high level and I think

12

they have come to expect and probably deserve to be

13

maintained at a fairly high level.

14

appropriate to punish them anymore than they are being

15

punished by reason of the fact of the divorce and I think

16

he has the capability of paying child support in the

17

increased amount and I think the increased amount is

I just don't feel it's

18 | minimum to keep them going at least in an assemblance of
19 I what they've had before.
20

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

21

MR. ANDREASEN:

Your Honor, —
Oh, excuse me.

I had a few

22

others.

The next question would be dealing the elements of

23

the judgment.

24

you are adding $20,000 to the judgment for H of the hall,

25

or excuse me, the dental practice.

As I understood, if I understood correctly,
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1

THE COURT:

That's right.

2

MR. ANDREASEN:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. ANDREASEN:

$8,000 for H of the duplex.

That's right.
So she's getting benefit of all

5

of the property settlement, the assets side but he is

6

picking up all of the tax liability?

7

THE COURT: Yes.

8 J

MR. ANDREASEN:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

I think that's what I said.

There

10

were a couple of things that I considered in that.

Even

11

though the $125,000 became a marital asset, I just, and

12

there was another factor, well, both parties have pointed

13

the finger at the other as being the responsible party for

14

the extravagant life style.

15

isn't both of them but they're involved somewhat.

16

Although, this is probably the primary responsibility for

17

the money.

I recognize that it probably

That was another factor that I considered in

18 | ordering that he, you know, pick that up.

I just felt like

19 I from the stand point of the equities, that ought to be his
20

responsibility and then, of course, his ability to pay on

21

those he's going to pay. You know, there was a lot of

22

discussion earlier, too, about the commissioner's order

23 I concerning her having to work.
24 I concerning that.

I haven't made any order

I feel like she's going to have to make

25 J her own decisions about that.

I think it would be great

1

for her to go back and get her education and try to develop

2

some skills.

3

thing is just exactly what her outburst was, you know, I'm

4

not really getting anything.

5

reason is because there isn't anything there to give her.

6

That's primarily the problem.

7

blown away everything that they had.

8
9
10

The real heartburn I'm having about the whole

She's right. And the primary

Now, they've absolutely

Why don't you ask your attorney first and if it's
something that should be brought to my attention, I'll be
glad to consider it.

11

Those are some of the factors that the Court was

12

considering in assigning, and assessing that

13

responsibility.

14

MR. ANDREASEN:

I believe the final question that

15

I had was regarding attorney's fees.

16

what —

17

THE COURT:

I'm not quite sure

He had filed an aff idavit relating to

18 | about, as I recall, was it about
$13,000 for his fees plus
<
19

there was some costs of expert witnesses and that sort of

20

thing and I think under the current state of the law that

21

they are entitled
<
to that.

22

the judgment.

23

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Once again it will be a part of

Your Honor, I think

24 1 (inaudibleB) .
?5

MS. ROUNDY: Judge , who did you award the
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attorney's fees to?
THE COURT:
MS. ROUNDY:

Pardon me?
Attorney feefs to?

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ANDREASEN:

Could I just observe that there

was an order in place for Dr. Barney to pay the property
taxes on the Ogden home which are now $8,800 in arrears.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ANDREASEN:

I thought I told (inaudible) all

about that.
THE COURT:

Well, let's put it this way.

I'm

going to order that he hold her harmless if any claim is
made against her for those fees because the commissioner
did assign that responsibility to him.
to require her to pay them.

And I'm not going

If a claim is made against her

where she is required to then I'll order him to hold her
harmless.

And once again that wouldn't become a part of

that judgment which constitutes a lien against the
practice.
MR. ANDREASEN:
it quickly.

I'm just trying to think through

Would that be a personal, those taxes only

attach to the property itself.

I don't believe under Utah

law she would ever have any obligation personally.
THE COURT:

Yes, well, if that's the case then I

guess we won't have to worry about it.
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MR. ANDREASEN:
2

THE COURT:

Okay.

But, once again, now see there may be

3

a contractual responsibility and if that is the case, and

4

if a claim were made against her, based upon the contract

5 I of sale between Mr. Burgy and them, then that would be his
6
7
8

problem, Dr. Barney's problem.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Yes.

The Court has awarded her the

property and should she lose the property only because of

9 I the $8,800 in which she is in arrears, how does the Court
10

want to deal with that problem?

11

THE COURT:

12

In other words, you feel like there

is a possibility she might be able to keep the property if

13 | he were to pay to her the amount of the back due taxes?
14
15

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I don't know what her position

is but I would think she would probably want to try.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. ANDREASEN:

18 | unaffordable.

Do you want to be heard on that?
Well, I believe it's

I mean we were talking $3,700 of monthly

19

cost on that thing.

The Court order will be in the

20

neighborhood of $4,200 and $2,000, I mean $3,500 of $4,200

21

in support is going to be just for the home.

22

not affordable.

23

over, let somebody else worry about the property taxes and

It just is

The practical solution is deed it back

24 I get her into acceptable housing.
25

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Your Honor, I think it should
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1

be up to her.

2

THE COURT:

It is.

3

is talking the practical side.

4

M S . ROUNDY: I,

5

THE COURT:

—

And I think what he was doing
Candidly,

—

—
part of the extravagance is the

6

house.

I can't imagine.

But, if there is a possibility of

7

her being able to save the home through someone assisting

8 J her or something like that then I would order him to pay
9

them.

10

M S . ROUNDY: Can I say something?

11

THE COURT: Why don't you say it to your attorney?

12

M S . ROUNDY: I think I can ask it better.

13 I

THE COURT:

14

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

15

(Inaudible.)
If your Honor is willing, I

would be willing to at least pass on what she wants to say.

16

THE COURT:

Sure.

17 I

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Her concern is that alimony

18 I will terminate if she ever remarries and she'll
19 I get nothing.

absolutely

And her request to the Court is that there be

20

made some property element of the alimony to let it

21

continue in that situation.

22

THE COURT:

If you can tell me how to do that,

23 J counsel, I'd be delighted to.

And I mean that sincerely.

24 I That's one of the problems of the case, you know, and I
25

recognize that up front.

I do.

And if there was a way of
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1

accomplishing that I would be delighted.

2

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Well, I mean there is a way to

3

make that happen and that is by awarding her a marital

4

property division at $2,000 for five years and $3,000 a

5

month for (inaudible).

6
7

MR. ANDREASEN:

property and we're getting all the debt, all the taxes.

8
9

You're already getting half the

MS. ROBERTSON: I know but that's 23 years of my
life.

10

THE COURT:

That's the concern.

It's not just

11

today.

What we are doing is talking ten years from now and

12

the alimony award obviously is saying to her, you can never

13

remarry.

14
15

MS. ROUNDY:

I know it is.

It's saying my life

ended when I —

16

MR. ANDREASEN:

17

THE COURT:

18 I you what.

It's Utah law.

Well, I understand.

Well, I'll tell

I'll, why don't we prepare the necessary

19 j findings, conclusions, and decree and I'll hold under
20

advisement that specific issue of how to deal with this so

21

that she has a property interest as opposed to something

22

else.

23

Appellate Court's are probably going to say, you know, a

But, I'm afraid, lfm kind of afraid that the

24 I rose by any other name is still a rose.
25

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Well, I think there are a lot
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1

of equitable interests in this case and —

2

THE COURT:

Well, there are but the equitable

3

interests has been pretty well resolved by the Supreme

4

Court contrary to your client's best interest and, you

5

know, I really sympathize.

6

sympathize, but if you'll submit to me some authorities on

7

that issue, supply counsel a copy of them, give him an

8

opportunity to respond, I'll be glad to consider that, that

9

particular request.

10

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

11

THE COURT:

12

I have to tell you, I really

Thank you.

Maybe we ought to establish some time

limitations so that we can reach, you know, so there can

13 I finality because we do need to have this final and the
14

parties get on with their lives.

15 I

MR. ANDREASEN:

I'd be happy to give the first

16

shot at the findings, conclusions, and decree, if that's

17

acceptable.

18 |

THE COURT:

19 I

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

20

Is that okay?
My client would prefer that I

try that.

21

THE COURT:

Well, all right.

22

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

23

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

All right.

And we'll reserve this other issue

24 I and could you say within about maybe 14 days or something
25 I submit me some authorities?
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Sure, that will be great,

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

n
t.

3

And then could you say take 10 days

or something in response?
Certainly.

4

MR. ANDREASEN:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

7

Oka^
Could I just bring one other

smaill matter to the Court' s attention?

8

THE COURT:

You bet.

9

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

In terms of the bus travel of

10

the children, there is a concern about a bus transfer being

11

required and having the children being out in the middle of

12

the night.

13

concerned about, could it be a one way trip without an

14

exchange of buses if he is going to use ground

15

transportation?

16
17
18

If that is something that the Court is

THE COURT:

I think that would probably be in the

best interests of everyone.
MR. ANDREASEN:

We would certainly stipulate that

19

the children need to be kept in a safe situation.

As we

20

understand the bus companies themselves will, in essence,

21

do the same as the airlines and the bus driver will make

22

sure that they are handed only to appropriate people or

23

maintain their security if there is a stop or something

24

along those lines.

25

in that regard to make sure the children are safe.

So, no question, we want to cooperate
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THE COURT:
2 I
3
4

Okay.

MR, CHRISTENSEN:

I'm not exactly sure what that

meant.
THE COURT:

Well, I think what he is saying is

5 I that's not a problem, that they would agree.
6 J

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
MR. ANDREASEN:

8 j
9
10 I

THE COURT:

That a one way bus trip -

It's always a one way bus trip

—

Well, you know, so they don't have to

transfer buses and that sort of thing.
MR. ANDREASEN:

Subject to the bus company, as

11

the airlines do, making sure they keep the children safe if

12

they're alone.

13 I

THE COURT:

14 |

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

15
16
17

Okay.

Anything else?
So, is the bottom line that the

children can transfer and ride the bus so long a s —
THE COURT:

You know, I have some sympathy with

idea that they wouldn't have to, obviously the bus is going

18 | to stop in various locations but 19 |
20

MS. ROUNDY:

There is a bus transfer on the trip

to Bozeman, that's why I'm concerned.

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. ROUNDY:

Where do they transfer from?
I don't know but it's not a straight

23 I shot and they have to get on a different bus.

And also, he

24 I wants the two youngest ones, the 10 and the 13 year old to
25 I travel without the older one on the bus and I don't want
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that to happen.

Those two children do not get along*

They

fight all the time and they could get themselves kicked off
3 I the bus somewhere along the route. And I'm very concerned
4

with the safety of the children on the bus, especially when

5

he has factored into his thing $500 for transportation for

6 J the kids.

It doesn't cost that much more to fly them.
MR. ANDREASEN:

Your Honor, may we contact the

8

bus company and, I'm sure they have established procedures.

9

We'll obtain those for your Honor and make sure that they

10

are adequate for the protection of the children.

11

THE COURT:

That's fair.

Why don't you get

12

whatever it is that you need to get and supply that to

13

counsel?

14

MR. ANDREASEN: Sure.

15

MS. ROBERTSON: Can we stipulate that they all

16

three have to be together if they go, not just the two

17

youngest?

18

THE COURT:

Well, but you see at the present time

19 | that would work fine but soon the oldest one, in another
20

couple of years might not be available and the younger ones

21

presumably will get a little older and a little more

22

mature.

So, it would be difficult to establish a rule now

23 J that's going to have application.
24
25

MS. ROUNDY: Well, I can't let my 13 year old and
my 10 year old travel on that bus together by themselves.
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1
2

THE COURT:
that.

3
A

Any I don't see any problem with

MS. ROUNDY: You don't know the kids.

They can't

even ride in a car together, they fight.

5

THE COURT:

Hold on, hold on.

They are not

6

always going to be 13 and 10 and they are not always going

7

to fight.

8
9

MS. ROBERTSON: Well, can we put an age when they
turn 16 or 17 or something?

10

THE COURT:

Well, why don't we take a look at

11

what the bus company can do for us and then we'll consider

12

that.

13
14

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I think her big concern is that

the bus ride takes 12 hours

15

MS. ROBERTSON: It takes 12 hours.

16

THE COURT:

17

resilient.

I know, I know.

But kids are

Anything else?

18

MR. ANDREASEN:

No, your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

20 J

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)

Court's in recess

21
22
23
24
25
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